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A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE CFC & FIF REGIMES: PART ONE 1987 
TO 1 DECEMBER 2003. 
 
Abstract   
 
The CFC & FIF regimes were originally enacted to prevent New Zealand taxpayers 
using tax havens to avoid or defer their New Zealand tax obligations.  However both 
regimes contain a number of provisions that have not been adopted by any of the 
major OECD countries or any of NZ major trading partners.  For example, the CFC 
regime does not contain an active income exemption and the FIF regime often taxes 
unrealised capital gains.  Those features have lead to widespread criticism and a range 
of taxpayer responses to ameliorate the negative impact the current rules have on 
legitimate off shore trade and investment decisions.  Part one of this article examines: 
 
- the tax planning opportunities which both regimes were designed to curtail, 
 
 
- the behavioural responses of taxpayers to the perceived harshness of the 
current law, and 
 
 
- the McLeod Committee recommendations, which were designed to achieve a 
more appropriate balance between taxpayers, legitimate commercial offshore 
investment decisions and the ongoing threat posed by tax havens. 
 
 
- DAVID DUNBAR.               
- MARCH  2004. 
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An historical review of the CFC and FIF regimes: 
Part one 1987 to 1 December 2003. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 A review of the FIF regime 
On 6 August 2003 the Minister of Revenue1 announced that:  
 
… an issues paper will be released in October [2003] for consultation 
on proposals to deal with this and other problems that arise under the 
foreign investment fund rules.  One of the options canvassed will be a 
version of the McLeod Review's risk-free rate of return method. 
 
The problem that the Minister was referring to was a scheme that enabled a New 
Zealand resident taxpayer to avoid paying New Zealand income tax on New Zealand 
Government Stock (NZGS).  According to the Minister, New Zealand resident 
taxpayers were investing in Australian unit trusts that in turn acquired the NZGS.  
Under the current New Zealand and Australian tax regimes the Australian unit trust 
could "convert" what would otherwise have constituted gross interest income into a 
tax-free receipt in the hands of the New Zealand resident investor.   
 
1.2 Alternative tax efficient investments 
The Minister's announcement was confined to Australian unit trusts.  There are at 
least two other well-known tax effective investments structures that are widely offered 
within New Zealand that were not discussed by the Minister.  They are: 
 
- Open ended investment companies (OEIC's) 
- Unit trusts such as Schroder Asia Pacific Fund PLC (Schroder) and 
Foreign & Colonial Euro Trust PLC (Foreign & Colonial). 
 
Both of these investment trusts are listed on the London stock exchange.  From a tax 
perspective, the advantage of both of these funds is that they are resident in a grey list 
country, i.e. the United Kingdom.  However, both of the funds hold a significant 
percentage of their investments in companies that are resident in non-grey list 
countries.  If a New Zealand individual shareholder had directly invested in any of 
those non-grey list country investments, then prima facie the FIF regime would apply.  
From a New Zealand tax perspective, an OEIC offers similar tax advantages.   
 
 
                                            
1
 The Hon Dr Michael Cullen's announcement is available at 
www.taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz/index.php?view=248. The Issues Paper, entitled “Taxation of non-controlled 
offshore investment in equity” was released on 16 December 2003. 
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1.3 Scope of this article 
New Zealand’s international tax regime was designed to prevent New Zealand 
resident taxpayers from avoiding or deferring New Zealand income tax by 
establishing offshore entities in low tax jurisdictions.  If there were no controlled 
foreign corporation (CFC), foreign investment funds (FIF) and trust regimes it would 
be a comparatively simple exercise for New Zealand resident individuals and 
companies to divert income which would otherwise have been derived by them into a 
foreign entity.   
 
The CFC regime was enacted in 1988 and the FIF regime finally came into force in 
1993.  Neither regime has been significantly amended since they came into force. In 
late 2001 the McLeod2 Committee highlighted a number of important issues 
concerning the appropriateness of the two current regimes and recommended a 
number of alternative options.  The Committee did not explicitly focus on the range of 
tax effective investment products such as Australian unit trusts that have prompted the 
Minister into action. 
 
This article examines: 
- the background to the enactment of both the CFC and FIF regimes 
- problems that have arisen since their enactment (including submissions to 
the McLeod Committee) 
- the behavioural responses to the CFC and FIF regimes 
- the McLeod Committee criticism and recommendations 
- future reform, where to from here? 
A subsequent article will examine the implications of the significant changes to the 
current FIF regime that are proposed in the Issues Paper released on 16 December 
2003 on the “Taxation of non-controlled offshore investment in equity”. That 
document was prepared by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) and the Treasury as 
a response to a recommendation made by the McLeod Committee that the current FIF 
regime needed to be reformed. For this reason, the law as at 1 December 2003 forms 
the basis of this article. 
 
 The December Issues Paper did not consider any of the McLeod Committee 
recommendations for reforming the current CFC regime. However there have been a 
number of recent developments in Australia, which provide an interesting alternative 
to the McLeod Committee’s recommendations. A subsequent article will also 
consider: 
 
- the review of Australian international taxation arrangements and the 
options for reform that were contained in the August 2002 consultation 
paper prepared by the Australian Treasury 
                                            
2
 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/taxreview 2001. The final report is no longer on the IRD web site. 
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- the report of the Australian Board of Taxation to the Australian Treasurer 
released in February 2003 on international taxation 
- the Australian government announcement in May 2003 of significant 
changes to the CFC regime, which represent a major shift in the 
underlying policy of the Australian CFC regime. 
 
2. The objectives of a CFC/FIF regime 
2.1 Tax planning opportunities 
If there was no CFC/FIF regime then New Zealand resident taxpayers could avoid or 
defer the payment of New Zealand income tax by establishing entities in well-known 
tax havens such as the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, and the Bahamas.  
Alternatively they could support New Zealand's South Pacific neighbours such as the 
Cook Islands, Western Samoa, or Vanuatu. 
 
2.2 The Income tax Act 1976  
Prior to the enactment of the current CFC and FIF regimes there were a number of 
features in the Income Tax Act 1976 (the 1976 Act) which assisted the New Zealand 
taxpayers to minimize their tax liability.  These are discussed in the following 
paragraphs.     
 
2.2.1 Corporate residence 
The first such aspect was a narrow definition of corporate residence.  Cases such as 
New Zealand Forest Products Finance NV v CIR3 demonstrate how it was possible to 
effectively control a foreign corporation without bringing the foreign entity within the 
definition of a resident company for New Zealand tax purposes. 
 
2.2.3 Section CB 10 
Before the enactment of the foreign dividend withholding payment regime (FDWP) 
all inter-company dividends were exempt from New Zealand company tax.   
Accordingly, it was possible for a New Zealand parent company to incorporate a 
foreign subsidiary that could be used to divert income, which would otherwise have 
been derived, by the New Zealand parent company.  The accumulated tax-free income 
could then be paid out as a dividend to the New Zealand parent company.  Tax would 
only become payable if the New Zealand parent company distributed the foreign 
source income to a New Zealand resident individual shareholder.   
 
2.2.3 Section 106(1)(h)(iii)  
Section 106(1)(h)(iii) of the 1976 Act permitted a parent company to claim an interest 
deduction in respect of interest paid on borrowed money which was used by the 
                                            
3
 (1995) 17 NZTC 12,073. 
CFC/FIF ARTICLE 
   8 
parent company to subscribe for shares in a New Zealand subsidiary.  There was 
nothing in that provision which prevented the New Zealand subsidiary from using the 
proceeds from the share issue to its New Zealand parent company to subscribe for 
equity in a foreign company.  This provision effectively provided for a “mismatch” 
against the New Zealand revenue base.  
 
The three building blocks (in 2.2) enabled New Zealand resident companies to set up 
the following “tax efficient” structures. 
 
2.3    “Tax efficient” structures  
2.3.1 “Money-go-rounds” and “dividend trap” companies 
The intercompany dividend exemption and section 106(1)(h)(iii) enabled a New 
Zealand parent company to incorporate a “money box” company in a tax haven which 
would undertake investments that the New Zealand parent company would otherwise 
have made.  Any income arising from the investment avoided both the New Zealand 
source rules and any New Zealand tax which would otherwise have been payable if 
the foreign subsidiary were a New Zealand resident for tax purposes.   
 
An alternative structure would be to interpose between the New Zealand parent and its 
overseas trading subsidiaries, a dividend trap company located in a tax haven.  
Dividends derived by the tax haven company, could then be used to fund investments 
that would ordinarily have been undertaken by the New Zealand parent company.   
 
2.3.2 “Captive insurance companies” 
Another form of passive investment that could be made via a tax haven was the 
creation of a “captive insurance company”.  In the absence of a CFC/FIF regime, a 
captive insurance company could play a useful role in cases where a corporate group 
decide to self-insure some or all of its risk.  Premiums paid by a New Zealand 
subsidiary to a foreign subsidiary will generally speaking satisfy the ordinary test of 
deductibility for New Zealand tax purposes.  However, unlike a “money box” or 
“dividend trap” company, there is an element of tax leakage because section 209 of 
the 1976 Act provided that premiums paid in respect of New Zealand risk are subject 
to a flat rate of tax at 10%.4  
 
2.3.3 Intellectual Property 
A third form of passive income which could be trapped in a tax haven were royalties 
arising from intellectual property rights held by a “patent holding” company.  
However, there was a similar degree of tax leakage because the royalty payment 
would satisfy the definition of a royalty in section 2 of the 1976 Act that would trigger 
a liability to Non Resident Withholding Tax (NRWT) under section 311 of the 1976 
Act.   
 
                                            
4
 However section 209 of the 1976 Act did not apply to a contract of reinsurance, and section 210 only 
applied to underwriters carrying on the business of reinsurance in New Zealand.  One way of avoiding 
the 10% tax leakage was to establish a New Zealand resident captive insurance company who reinsured 
with a capture non resident reinsurance company. 
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2.3.4 Active income 
Similar structures could be used to trap “active income” in a tax haven.  A common 
example would be the incorporation of a foreign sales or distribution subsidiary that 
was interposed between the New Zealand parent company and the ultimate third party 
customers of the parent company.  Profit that would ordinarily have arisen in New 
Zealand is diverted to the foreign subsidiary via transfer pricing strategies.   
 
A second variation on this general theme is the incorporation of an offshore service 
subsidiary which arranges for the provision of corporate services that are often 
unnecessary, or provided at over inflated prices. 
 
2.4 Overseas Experience 
At the time the CFC regime was enacted, six other countries had been sufficiently 
concerned about these types of tax driven strategies to enact controlled foreign 
corporation legislation.  It is significant to note that none of those countries had the 
additional problem of an inter-corporate dividend exemption and an interest deduction 
provision comparable to section 106(1)(h)(iii).  By 1988, Canada, France, Japan, West 
Germany, United Kingdom and the United States of America had all adopted a similar 
legislative format in that controlling resident shareholders were taxed on their pro rata 
share of the CFC’s income.  Some of the important attributes of these regimes are 
summarised in Table A. 
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Table A:  Summary ( as at 1988) of selected CFC Legislative Solutions  
 
 Scope Low tax rates Listed 
countries 
Exemptions 
France  - 25% ownership 
- no limit to number of shareholders 
- direct and indirect tracing rules 
Foreign tax <66% 
French tax rate 
Unofficial 
blacklist 
- Active business 
exemption 
- Foreign tax credit 
Japan - 50% ownership  
- designated tax havens 
- direct and indirect tracing rules 
Foreign tax <50% 
Japanese tax rate 
Unofficial 
blacklist 
- Active business 
exemption 
- Foreign tax credit 
West 
Germany 
- 50% ownership 
- designated tax havens 
- direct and indirect tracing rules 
Foreign tax rate 
<30% 
West German tax 
rate  
Unofficial 
blacklist 
- Active business 
exemption 
- Foreign tax credit 
United 
Kingdom 
- 50% ownership 
- designated tax havens 
- direct and indirect tracing rules 
Foreign tax <50% 
UK tax rate 
Unofficial 
blacklist 
- Active business 
exemption 
- Foreign tax credit 
 
Canada and the USA have been excluded from Table A.  Those two countries adopted 
the transactional approach.  This technique involves specifying the specific types of 
income that will be attributable to the resident controlling shareholders.  The specified 
types of income are subject to the regime regardless of the jurisdiction in which the 
CFC is located.  This approach was not adopted by New Zealand and for that reason it 
is not considered in this article.  The second method that was adopted by New 
Zealand and the four countries in Table A is known as the jurisdictional approach to 
CFCs.  Under that approach, the emphasis is placed on the location of the CFC as 
opposed to the transactions or type of income derived by that entity.  The 
jurisdictional approach usually involves the publication of lists of countries that are 
either included or excluded from the legislation.   
 
For reasons which will become apparent later in this article, it is significant to note 
that each of the four countries all contain an active business income exemption.  This  
exemption is usually justified on the grounds of corporate competitiveness.   
 
3. Pre CFC/FIF Tax Planning Opportunities 
3.1 Introduction 
The necessity for a robust CFC/FIF is demonstrated by the facts of Europa Oil (No 
1),5 Europa Oil (No. 2)6 and the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Dandelion 
Investments Limited.7  An interesting question (which will not be explored in this 
article) is why it took fourteen years for a legislative response to the significant risk to 
the New Zealand domestic tax base that was identified in the two Europa Oil 
decisions.   
                                            
5
 Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd (No 1) v CIR [1971] NZLR 641 (Europa Oil (No 1)) 
6
 Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd (No 2) v CIR [1976] 2 NZTC 61,006 (Europa Oil (No 2)) 
7
 CIR v Dandelion Investments Ltd (2003) 21 NZTC 18, 013 (Dandelion Investments) 
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3.2 Europa Oil (No 1) 
For the purposes of this article the important relationship between the New Zealand 
entities and the offshore entities is shown in Diagram 1.   
 
Diagram 1 - Europa Oil (No 1) 
 
 
     
   50%  50%  50%  
 
 
  Dividend 2.5¢ Dividend 2.5¢ 
 
 
 
 Ownership 
 Contracts 
 Dividends 
 
By way of background it should be noted that the structure was not designed to 
manufacture a tax advantage associated with the absence of a CFC/FIF regime.  
Although the structure, which was ultimately created by the parties, had all the 
hallmarks of a classic reinvoicing operation, the commercial objectives were to 
disguise from other interested parties, the provision of a discount.   
 
The taxpayer Europa Oil was a member of an associated group of companies, which 
marketed and distributed petrol throughout New Zealand.8  Europa’s main 
competitors were all controlled by multinational corporations, which enabled them 
to obtain long term,
 secure sources of raw materials from the Middle East.  Europa 
Oil had no interest in any similar fields.  Consequently it had to purchase its stock in 
trade from one of the major international oil companies.   
 
An American company (Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf)) did not have a sufficient 
international market for what was known as “light end products” and no outlet for 
those products in New Zealand.  Accordingly, Gulf and Europa Oil entered into an 
arrangement, which suited their mutual interests.  The taxpayer needed a secure 
source of light end products, and Gulf was in a position to meet all of the taxpayers 
needs.   
 
The commercial problem was that bulk supplies of crude oil and refined products 
were sold at “posted prices” which were designed to prevent offering discounts.  In 
order to secure an assured outlet in New Zealand for its surplus light end products, 
Gulf agreed to forego a proportion of the refiner’s profit, which was reflected in the 
posted prices.  Accordingly, the structure summarised in Diagram 1 was primarily 
designed to disguise the fact that Gulf was prepared to offer a discount equal to 2.5¢ 
per gallon of gasoline supplied to the taxpayer.   
                                            
8
 For further details refer to Europa Oil (No 2) judgment of the Court of Appeal (1974) 1 NZTC 61,169 
and the judgment of the Privy Council (1976) 2 NZTC 61,066. 
Europa Oil AMC Pan Eastern Gulf 
Sale Processing and 
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Gulf however was for business reasons unwilling to depart from the 
establish system of posted prices by making this concession in the form 
of a reduction in the price at which it sold the refined products to the 
taxpayer company.  So the benefit of the concession of 2.5¢ had to be 
given by Gulf to the Todd Group in some other form. 
 
That form was Pan Eastern a company incorporated in the Bahamas.  Pan Eastern was 
a classic letterbox company.  It did not undertake any refining.  Under the processing 
contract between Pan Eastern and the Gulf group, the refining was undertaken by Gulf 
on behalf of Pan Eastern, in a way in which enabled Pan Eastern to derive a profit of 
5¢ per gallon.  That profit was split between Gulf and Pan Eastern’s other shareholder 
Associated Motorist Company Limited (AMC).  The dividend of 2.5¢ per gallon was 
derived by AMC free of New Zealand tax by virtue of the inter-company dividend 
exemption.   
 
The insertion of Pan Eastern into the commercial relationship between Europa Oil and 
Gulf created a classic tax mismatch against the CIR.  Europa Oil sought to claim a 
deduction for the full price paid to Pan Eastern without adjusting for the tax-free 
dividend of 2.5¢ per gallon.  In the absence of a CFC/FIF regime the CIR could only 
attack the arrangement under the general deduction provision or the anti avoidance 
provision.  He was successful under the former and consequently the application of 
the latter did not arise. 
 
In relation to the predecessor to sec. BD 2(1)(b)9 of the Income Tax Act 1994 (the 
1954 Act) the majority of the Privy Council held at p. 6,019: 
For a claim to disallow a portion of expenditure incurred in 
purchasing trading stock to succeed, the Crown, in their Lordships’ 
judgment, must show that, as part of the contractual arrangement 
under which the stock was acquired some advantage, not identifiable 
as, or related to the production of, assessable income, was gained, so 
that a part of the expenditure, which can be segregated and quantified, 
ought to be considered as consideration given for the advantage.  
Taxation by end result, or by economic equivalence, is not what the 
section achieves.   
 
The Diagrammatic summary of the relationship between the parties strongly suggests 
there was an interdependence of commercial obligations and benefits that flowed from 
the contracts which, thought written as separate documents, represented a single 
contractual whole.  The expenditure had to be apportioned because: 
To their Lordships it appears that the conclusion can only be in favour 
of the Commissioner.  The integration of Europa’s agreement to buy 
gasoline, at posted prices, with Gulf’s agreement to provide earnings 
for Pan Eastern, is far too close, and far too carefully worked out, to 
permit the isolation of the agreement for sale (products contract) and 
the treatment of the expenditure incurred under it as incurred 
exclusively for the purchase of trading stock. (p. 6,020) 
                                            
9
 Section 108 of the Land and Income Tax Act 1954 (the 1954 Act) 
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Having found for the Commissioner under the predecessor to section BD 2(1)(b), the 
majority did not consider the potential application of the predecessor of section BG 1 
of the Act.   
 
The approach of the Privy Council and the outcome suggested that the existing law 
could cope with offshore letterbox companies and reinvoicing arrangements.  
However that was all about to change.   
 
3.3 Europa Oil (No 2) 
The 1956 contracts (the subject of Europa Oil (no.1)) reflected the fact that at the time 
they were entered into New Zealand did not have any ability to refine petroleum 
products.  In 1964 the Marsden Point Refinery was completed which meant that 
Europa Oil no longer required fully refined product.  It did however need semi-refined 
feedstock.   
 
The 1964 contractual relationship between the parties is summarised in Diagram 2.  A 
comparison between Diagrams 1 and 2 indicates that two new companies were 
introduced into the arrangement.  The first was Gulfex, a subsidiary of Gulf and the 
second was Europa Refining, which was a New Zealand resident company that was a 
member of the Todd group of companies.   
 
Diagram 2: Europa Oil (No 2) 
 
 
    
   Sale  100% 
 
 Sale 
 
 
 Dividend 2.5c   
 
 Ownership 
 Contracts 
 Dividends 
 
 
In view of the approach taken by the Court of Appeal and the majority of the Privy 
Council, it is important to understand the relationship between Europa Oil and Europa 
Refining.   
 
Lord Diplock delivered the advice of the majority of the Privy Council.  He noted that 
the relationship between Europa Oil and Europa Refining was that Europa Refining 
was not a subsidiary of Europa Oil and that neither company was a subsidiary of the 
same parent company in the Todd group.10  Further details of the shareholding and 
ownership of the Todd group is contained in the judgment of McCarthy P.11  Based on 
the information contained in these two judgements, it would appear that the ownership 
structure was as follows: 
                                            
10
 Per Lord Diplock (1976) 2 NZTC 61,066, p61,069 
11
 Per McCarthy P (1974) 1 NZTC 61,169, p61,177 
Europa Refining Gulfex 
Europa Oil AMP Pan Eastern Gulf 
Sale 
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Diagram 3: Ownership structure of Europa Oil Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5% 95% 95% 5% 
 
 
 
  96% 
 
 
 
 
Diagrams 2 and 3 demonstrate the legal correctness of the proposition that the legal 
effect as distinct from the economic consequences of the arrangement was that 
whenever Europa Oil ordered goods from Europa Refining and accepted the 
obligation to pay the sum stipulated in that contract as the purchase price, Europa Oil 
only acquired a legally enforceable right to the delivery of the goods and did not 
obtain any other benefit or moneys worth.12  This conclusion followed from the fact 
that Europa Oil was under no contractual obligation to purchase its requirements for 
feedstock from Europa Refining.  The dividend of 2.5¢ per gallon derived by AMP 
arose from a different set of contractual relationship between inter alia Europa 
Refining and Gulfex, between Gulfex and Pan Eastern, and between Pan Eastern and 
inter alia Gulf.  Accordingly: 
 
It follows that that whenever the Taxpayer Company entered into a 
contract with Europa Refining for the sale and delivery of one or more 
cargo lots of feedstocks and thereby accepted an obligation to pay the 
sum stipulated in that contract as the purchase price, the only right 
that it thereby acquired which was legally enforceable against anyone 
was the right to delivery of the feedstocks by Europa Refining.13 
 
Accordingly Europa Oil was permitted to claim the full amount under the predecessor 
to section BD 2(1)(b). 
 
The approach of the majority of the Privy Council in Europa Oil No 2 demonstrated 
the necessity for a CFC/FIF regime to protect the New Zealand tax base from offshore 
reinvoicing operations.  There was nothing in principle to prevent a New Zealand 
exporter from devising a similar structure to trap a proportion of the profit.  
 
The symbiotic nature of the economic relationship between Europa Oil and Europa 
Refining is demonstrated by the fact that Mr Brian Todd exercised effective control 
over the operations of both companies.  Europa Refining was a paper company with 
                                            
12
 Europa Oil (No 2) (1976) 2 NZTC 61,169.  Per Lord Diplock p61, 072 
13
 See note 7, p61, 074. 
??? 
Todd Investments ?? 
?? 
Europa Oil Todd Participants 
AMP Europa Refinery 
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no separate staff and a minimal organisational structure.  According to Lord 
Wilberforce it took no financial risks and made no profit.14   
 
The same was the case with Pan Eastern.  The five cents a gallon profit derived by 
Pan Eastern was not earned in respect of any commercial activity or effort undertaken 
by Pan Eastern.  That company was incorporated in the Bahamas and likewise had no 
staff and did not undertake any commercial risk.  The refining undertaken was 
performed by Gulf on behalf of Pan Eastern.  Pan Eastern’s role was to merely 
disguise the fact that a discount was being paid to Europa Oil.   
 
The relationship between Europa Oil and the Gulf group was primarily driven by 
commercial considerations.  Gulf had a surplus of “light end” products and no outlet 
in New Zealand, whereas Europa Oil was looking for a secure supply of products 
from the “light end” of the refining process.  Both parties set up a structure to disguise 
from other competitors the fact that Gulf was prepared to pay a discount.  Pan 
Eastern’s primary role was to facilitate the payment of a discount in a way, which did 
not depart from the established system of posted prices.  The facts of the two Europa 
Oil decisions illustrate the potential difficulty of distinguishing between active and 
passive income.  This is an issue discussed in the McLeod Committee’s Report. 
 
3.4  Passive Investments : Dandelion Investments Ltd  
The approach taken by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in this case15 prima 
facie suggests that section BG 1 of the Act can in some circumstances protect the tax 
base.  The following Diagram summarises the main entities and the transactions, 
which they entered into.16   
Diagram 4  :  The investments 
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 Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR) v Dandelion Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,293 (HC) 
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 This Diagram is based on the summary contained in the judgment of the TRA reported as Case U11 
(1999) 19 NZTC 9,100 at p9,127 and Appendix A attached to the judgement of Tompkins J reported in 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR) v Dandelion Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,293 at 
p17,309. 
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Briefly Dandelion Investments was a profitable manufacturing company, which prior 
to entering into the above arrangement derived substantial assessable income.  The 
taxpayer entered into a transaction in 1986 that involved the purchase of all of the 
share capital in a UK company (UK A) through CT, which was financed by a loan of 
$2.8m.  The UK vendor of the target company lent the money to a Cook Islands 
company (W), which in turn lent the $2.8m to three other Cook Island companies (P, 
B, F). Ultimately the loan finance was returned to a New Zealand company controlled 
by Euro National (EN), which had originally lent the $2.8m to the taxpayer.   
 
The tax advantage sought from the arrangement arose from the cash flows shown in 
Diagram 5: 
Diagram 5 : The tax mismatch 
 
 Dividend $484 $484 
 
 
 Dividend $480  
   
   Interest $570 
 
 ($570) 
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If one stands back from the series of individual transactions that made up the 
arrangement, the net effect was that for income tax purposes the taxpayer paid interest 
of approximately $570,000 which it sought to deduct from its other income.  That 
expenditure was partly funded by the tax-free dividend of approximately $484,000, 
which was used to pay most of the interest.  The remaining interest was effectively 
paid from the tax saving associated with the interest deduction.  The tax benefit 
converted what was otherwise a cash loss into a net benefit for the taxpayer of 
$188,000.   
 
The reasoning of the High Court was very brief and Tompkins J concluded that the 
respondent had not discharged the onus of proving the arrangement was not within the 
1976 Act equivalent to section BG 1.  Tompkins J formulated the issues as follows: 
The real issue is whether one of the purposes or effects of the 
arrangement (not being a merely incidental purpose or effect) was tax 
avoidance.  This is not affected by some other provision in the Act 
that may make the interest payable deductible. [Emphasis added]17 
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McGrath J delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal. He said:  
In reality there was no true business purpose to be achieved by the 
appellant in entering into the transaction other than to obtain the 
benefit of a deduction of an interest expense of $570,080 by making a 
payment of that sum which was to be offset by a tax-free dividend 
receipt of $484,000.  The transaction was circular in its inception and 
unwinding.  Once unwound after the 12 months term of the loan it had 
no financial effects for the appellant, other than its net outlay of 
$86,080 and, presumably a liability for the fees of its advisers.  There 
was no risk to the appellant during that period.  No element of business 
dealing other than tax avoidance can be identified as a purpose of the 
arrangement.  It is an artifice involving pretence and not a real group 
investment transaction at all.  The concessional treatment of interest 
expenses under s106(1)(h)(ii) of the 1976 Act for borrowings to 
acquire shares in what would be a group company was not, on its true 
construction, intended to give the taxpayer the opportunity of obtaining 
a deduction in this way.  It is the type of arrangement which s99 was 
enacted to counteract in terms of the approach taken to the provision 
by the Privy Council in O’Neil at para 10 and by this Court in BNZ 
Investments Ltd at para 40.  In those circumstances we agree with the 
High Court Judge that the purpose and effect of the composite 
arrangement was one of tax avoidance.  The arrangement was 
accordingly void under s99(2).18 
 
3.5 Can section BG 1 protect the New Zealand domestic tax base? 
In Dandelion the High Court upheld the IRD application of the predecessor to section 
BG 1 whereas in Europa Oil No 2 the Court of Appeal and Privy Council held that the 
equivalent to section BG 1 could not apply.  The majority of the Privy Council in 
Europa Oil No 1 did not need to consider this issue, whereas the minority held that the 
Commissioner’s argument was hopeless.  
 
3.5.1 Europa Oil (No 2) 
The Court of Appeal did not consider the application of section BG 1.19  Nor did Lord 
Wilberforce in his dissenting judgment.20  The observations of the majority of the 
Privy Council were made in respect of the old section BG 1 (section 108 of the 1954 
Act) which was amended in 1974.  In the context of both the 1956 and 1964 contracts 
and the predecessor to section BG 1, the majority made a number of observations 
which indicate the type of difficulties the IRD would face in trying to use section BG 
1 to attack offshore structures. 
 
                                            
18
 (2003) 21 NZTC 18,013 pp18,030-31.  The facts of Dandelion are extreme and are far removed from 
the type of scenario, which is illustrated by Europa Oil that is more representative of the traditional role 
played by tax haven companies. In the author’s view, Dandelion does not provide a lot of meaningful 
insight into how section BG 1 could be used to combat tax haven companies. 
19
 (1974) 1 NZTC 61,169 McCarthy P p61, 198; Richmond J p61, 206; Beattie J p61, 209. 
20
 (1976) 2 NZTC 61,066 at p61,080. 
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Lord Diplock identified three well-known deficiencies in the old section 108.21  The 
first was the then new source of income rule. 
 
Lord Diplock said: 
The section [now section BG 1] does not strike at new sources of 
income or restrict the right of the taxpayer to arrange his affairs in 
relation to income from a new source in such a way as to attract the 
least possible liability to tax.22 
 
Despite the 1974 amendment which introduced a new definition of “tax avoidance”, 
“tax avoidance arrangement” and “liability”, Richardson J noted in CIR v Challenge 
Corporation Ltd23 (Challenge Corporation) that the new definition of “liability” does 
not apply to a “potential or prospective liability to future income tax”.  Those three 
definitions do not ipso facto repeal the new source of income rule discussed in Europa 
Oil No 2.  For example, Richardson J said in Challenge Corporation (at p. 5,021): 
A complicating fact is that every financial transaction of the taxpayer 
may effect a tax change and it is not to be supposed that a potential or 
prospective liability in respect of future income to which the definition 
refers, was intended to have that reach.  On the contrary, if the 
analysis of which I have been speaking leads to the conclusion that 
there is no room for the application of [now section BG 1], that is 
because the tax change, which has occurred, has not affected the 
liability to income tax, which the Act itself contemplates. 
 
The second deficiency identified by Lord Diplock was the proposition that the 
references in the definition of “tax avoidance” to a liability to pay income tax are 
references to New Zealand income tax.  His Lordship noted that the old section 108 
did not contain any extra territorial scope.  It did not apply to any arrangements 
involving entities located in offshore jurisdictions.   
 
Finally Lord Diplock noted that the old section 108 was an annihilating provision and 
that it did not contain a power of reconstruction. This well known deficiency was 
corrected in the 1974 amendment, which is reflected in the current section GB 1(1) 
that enables the Commissioner to adjust the taxpayer’s income in any manner, which 
will counteract the tax advantage obtained by the taxpayer from the arrangement.   
 
3.5.2 Dandelion Investments 
From a tax perspective the investment in the UK target company only worked because 
of the inter action between predecessors to sections CB 10 and DD 1(1)(b)(iii) and the 
company tax rate of 48%.  The tax saving associated with an interest deduction of 
$570,000 was $274,000 which taken in conjunction with a tax-free dividend of 
$484,000 converted a pre-tax loss of $86,000 ($484,000 minus $570,000) into a post-
tax benefit of $188,000.  The Taxation Review Authority, the High Court and Court 
                                            
21
 See note 8 above at p61,074-75. 
22
 See note 8 above at p61,074. 
23
 CIR v Challenge Corporation Ltd (1986) 8 NZTC 5,001 at p5, 021. 
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of Appeal concluded there were few, if any, commercial reasons (apart from the 
income tax benefit), which would have justified the taxpayer acquiring the UK target 
company.  According to Tompkins J: 
At the end of the arrangement after it had been unwound, there was 
nothing of any value left.  The [taxpayer] owed its subsidiary $2.8m 
and held shares in that company for exactly the same amount.24 
 
Accordingly, His Honour held that the respondent had not discharged the onus of 
proving that the arrangement was not within the predecessor to section BG 1 (Section 
99 of the 1976 Act).    
 
Were the courts correct in holding that the application of the equivalent provisions to 
section BG 1 was not affected by the equivalent section to DD 1(b)(iii)?  This 
approach calls into question the correctness of the decision of the majority of the 
Privy Council in Challenge Corporation that was recently criticised by the Privy 
Council in O’Neil v CIR25.  In reaching its conclusion, neither the High Court nor the 
Court of Appeal discussed the following cases that strongly suggest that approach of 
Privy Council in Challenge Corporation was conceptually incorrect. 
 
3.5.3 O’Neil v CIR 
Despite the fact that the CIR won this case26, there were at least two observations 
made by the Privy Council, which strongly suggest a broad analytical approach is not 
always correct.  
 
Lord Hoffman noted (p. 17,057) at paragraph 9:  
… the distinction between tax litigation and tax avoidance is unhelpful 
: as the Judge said it “describes a conclusion rather than providing a 
signpost to it”.  … The other is that they doubt the wisdom of using the 
concept of “impropriety” instead. 
 
This strongly suggests that the approach taken by the majority of the Court of Appeal 
in Challenge is now the correct way of reconciling the relationship between section 
BG 1 and a specific provision such as sections CB 10 and DD 1(1)(b)(iii).   
 
After noting the highly artificial nature of the “Russell template” and how it applied to 
the circumstances of the O’Neils, Lord Hoffman said in paragraph 10:  
Their Lordships consider this is to be a paradigm of the kind of 
arrangement which [Section BG 1] was intended to counteract.  On the 
other hand, the adoption of a course of action, which avoids tax, 
should not fall within [section BG 1] if the legislation, upon its true 
construction, was intended to give the taxpayer the choice of avoiding 
it in that way. 
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 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,293 p17,308 paragraph 92. 
25
 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,051 p17,056-57. 
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 (2001) 20 NZTC 17,051. 
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Section DD 1(1)(b)(iii) governs the deductibility of interest in the context of a group 
of companies.  It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this provision is designed to 
encourage a parent company to use borrowed finance to subscribe for equity in a 
group company.  It is significant to note that there is no statutory requirement that 
either the group company or the parent company must demonstrate that the borrowed 
finance produced gross income for either member of the group.  Clearly this section 
contemplates that a subsidiary can be interposed between the parent company and the 
ultimate investment.  In view of section CB 10 of the Act, there can be no other 
interpretation than the analysis summarised above, because section CB 10 provides 
that certain inter company dividends pass free of tax.  Accordingly, there could never 
be an explicit requirement in section DD 1(1)(b)(iii) that the borrowed money must 
produce gross income given that section CB 10 exempts from tax the anticipated 
income flow associated with any downstream investment made by the group 
company.   
 
In view of the clear statutory language it is difficult to see, in the words of McGrath J, 
why the true construction of this provision meant the taxpayer in Dandelion 
Investments had not satisfied the statutory test simply because the investment in the 
final company in the chain was not commercial. 
 
3.5.4 CIR v BNZ Investments Limited 
A similar approach was taken by Richardson P in this case27 which is also consistent 
with his Honour’s judgment in Challenge Corporation Richardson P said (at 
paragraph 41) p.17, 115: 
 
The function of [Section BG 1] is to protect the liability for income tax 
established under other provisions of the legislation.  The fundamental 
difficulty lies in the balancing of different and conflicting objections.  
Clearly the legislature could not have contended that [section BG 1] 
should override all provisions of the Act so as to deprive the taxpaying 
community of structural choices, economic incentives, exemptions and 
allowances provided by the Act itself.  Equally the general anti 
avoidance provision cannot be subordinated to all the specific 
provisions of the tax legislation.  … The general anti avoidance section 
thus represents an uneasy compromise in the income tax legislation.” 
 
This observation is significant because it was made in the context of an arrangement, 
which was conceptually similar to Dandelion Investments.  The Court of Appeal was 
asked to consider inter alia the relationship between predecessors to section BG 1, on 
the one hand and sections CB 10 and DD 1(1)(b)(iii) in the 1976 Act.  This question 
was not considered in any detail, because the majority of the Court of Appeal held 
there was no relevant "arrangement" within the meaning of the equivalent to 
section OB 1 of the 1976 Act and accordingly section 99 of the 1976 Act (now section 
BG 1) did not apply.   
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It is also significant to note that both the majority and minority judgements of the 
Court of Appeal in this case confirmed that the redeemable preference share 
transactions were regarded as commonplace and widespread and that the mandatory 
convertible note transactions were regarded as genuine involving actual fiscal 
consequences.   
 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that what occurred in both BNZI and Dandelion 
Investments is, in the words of Richardson P, a classic example of a structural choice.  
Sections CB 10 and DD 1(1)(b)(iii) do not outline any criteria from which an 
underlying assumption as to the intended scope of those two provisions can be 
derived.  Both sections clearly envisage a statutory mismatch, e.g. the derivation of an 
exempt dividend funded in part by an allowable interest deduction.  Secondly, neither 
provision contains any statutory language, which indicates that the ultimate derivation 
of gross income is an essential pre-requisite.  This is hardly surprising given that there 
is always an element of commercial risk and a positive requirement that gross income 
must be produced would be inconsistent with the approach taken in cases such as 
Grieve28, Pacific Rendezvous29 and Brierley30.  Thirdly, it should be noted that 
paragraph (i) and (ii) of section DD 1(1)(b) both contain a statutory requirement that 
the borrowed money and interest must produce gross income, whereas there is 
obviously no such similar requirement in paragraph (iii).  Finally the “new” section 
DD 1(3) does not refer to the derivation of gross income for a deduction to be 
claimed. 
 
3.5.5 CIR v Challenge Corporation Limited 
McGrath J's failure in Dandelion Investments31 to consider the implications of 
Richardson J’s approach to the equivalent of section BG 1 is a significant weakness in 
the Court of Appeal judgment.  His (McGrath J’s) approach mirrors the dicta cited 
from BNZI discussed above.  Challenge Corporation is also significant in that the 
Court of Appeal were asked to consider the relationship between a specific provision 
that governs the grouping and offsetting of company losses and the predecessor to 
section BG 1 of the Act.  The grouping provisions are conceptually similar to sections 
CB 10/DD 1(1)(b)(iii). 
 
The basic problem that was ignored by McGrath J is succinctly summarised by 
Richardson J in the following five propositions in Challenge: 
“Clearly the legislature could not have intended that [section BG 1] 
should override all other provisions of the Act so as to deprive the 
taxpaying community of structural choices, economic incentives, 
exemptions and allowances provided for by the Act itself.” (p5,019) 
“Seeking and taking advantage of incentives provided through the tax 
system designed to encourage particular economic activities should not 
be rejected out of hand as contravening the section.  Yet in many cases, 
but for the anticipated availability of the tax benefit, the taxpayer 
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would never have entered into the activity or transaction.  In more 
general terms such basic features as depreciation and trading stock 
valuations, which are not tied for tax purposes to accounting or 
economic concepts clearly allow for the deliberate pursuit of tax 
advantage.” (P5, 020) 
“It is the principle which is important and Keighery provides powerful 
support for the proposition that to do no more than adopt a course 
which the Act specifically contemplates as affecting a tax change does 
not affect the taxpayer’s ‘liability’ for income tax in the statutory sense 
and does not result in an alteration in the incidence of income tax 
contemplated by the Act.” (P5, 023) 
“Thus, the concepts of tax grouping and carry forward of losses 
employed in sections [IG] and [IF] respectively of [the Income Tax Act 
1994] must be characterised as tax concepts.  They have no reality 
under the statute except in relation to income tax.” (P5, 023)  
“On the analysis of the role of [sections IG and IF] in the statutory 
scheme and of the terms of the provision itself, I am satisfied that to 
treat the arrangement carried through in this case as tax avoidance 
within [section BG 1] would defeat, not promote, the legislative 
purposes involved.  The tax changes achieved in the transactions did 
not alter the incidence of income tax which the Act itself contemplated 
or affect Challenge’s liability for income tax in the sense indicated by 
the statute.” (P5, 026) 
 
Each of the above observations is directly applicable to sections CB 10 and 
DD 1(1)(b)(iii).  As noted above, both provisions contemplate a statutory mismatch 
against the New Zealand revenue base.  Secondly, neither provision contains any 
requirement that the underlying investment must produce gross income.  In most 
situations that would be impossible in view of section CB 10.  Both provisions clearly 
have no other purpose than to create a statutory mismatch and they can accordingly be 
categorised as pure tax concepts because they have no reality except for tax purposes.  
It is simply not possible to compare them with any other commercial norm.   
 
3.5.6 Westmoreland Investments v MacNiven 
In view of the fact that the United Kingdom income tax legislation does not contain a 
general anti avoidance provision this decision is not directly relevant.  However, the 
facts and approach of the House of Lords32 are consistent with O’Neil, Challenge 
Corporation and BNZI.   
 
The taxpayer Westmoreland Investments (WIL) was owned by a tax-exempt pension 
scheme.  WIL was used as the vehicle for undertaking property developments on 
behalf of the pension scheme.  The developments were financed by way of money lent 
to WIL by the scheme.  The investments failed.  At that time there was a market for 
companies with established tax losses, which could be sold to a purchaser who would 
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then transfer income-earning assets into the loss company.  However, for UK tax 
purposes the accrued interest was not deductible until it was paid.   
 
Accordingly, the pension scheme and WIL entered into a round robin transaction, 
which was designed to satisfy the technical requirement of the payment of interest.  
Briefly, the pension scheme lent WIL a sum of money, which was used to pay the 
accrued interest of over £40m.  It would appear that the UK revenue attacked the 
scheme because of the classic mismatch created by the allowable deduction and the 
corresponding exemption of interest income in the hands of the tax-exempt pension 
scheme.  Subsequently the pension scheme sold WIL to a purchaser for approximately 
2p in the £.  The pension scheme receives £2m for the sale of WIL. 
 
It is clear from the speeches delivered in the House of Lords that their Lordships 
accepted the transaction involved a circular flow of funds and that the payment of 
interest had no purpose other than to achieve a tax advantage.   
 
Counsel for the Inland Revenue Commissioners submission is outlined in paragraph 
28 (p.874) of Lord Hoffmann’s speech.  It was very similar to counsel for the CIR’s 
submission in Auckland Harbour Board33.  Both submissions were asking the court to 
ignore the scheme of the Act and the specific statutory test and invoke either a general 
anti avoidance provision or a general principle of interpretation, to strike down a 
transaction that otherwise satisfied the statutory test.  In paragraph 28 and 29 of his 
speech, Lord Hoffmann reiterated at page 874 that this has never been the role of the 
English courts: 
Everyone agrees that the W T Ramsay case is a principle of 
construction.  The House of Lords said so in IRC v McGuckian [1997] 
3 All ER 817, [1997] 1 WLR 991.  But what is that principle? 
But [Counsel for the IRC] formulation looks like an overriding legal 
principle, superimposed upon the whole of revenue law without regard 
to the language or purpose of any particular provision, save for the 
possibility of rebuttal by language, which can be brought within its 
final parenthesis. … But the courts have no constitutional authority to 
impose such an overlay upon the tax legislation and, as I hope to 
demonstrate, they have not attempted to do so.  
 
Lord Hoffmann’s approach to anti avoidance is consistent with the observations of 
Richardson P in BNZI and his Honour’s earlier judgment in Challenge Lord 
Hoffmann noted that income tax legislation often distinguishes between commercial 
and legal concepts.  The fiscal nullity principle of statutory construction could only 
apply (if at all) to commercial concepts.   
For the present purposes, however, the point I wish to emphasise is 
that Lord Brightman’s formulation in Furniss’ case, like Lord 
Diplock’s formulation in the Burmah Oil case, is not a principle of 
construction.  It is a statement of the consequences of giving a 
commercial construction to a fiscal concept.  Before one can apply 
Lord Brightman’s words, it is first necessary to construe the statutory 
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language and decide that it refers to a concept, which Parliament 
intended to be given a commercial meaning capable of transcending 
the juristic individuality of its component parts.  But there are many 
terms in tax legislation, which cannot be construed in this way. They 
refer to purely legal concepts, which have no broader commercial 
meaning.  In such cases, the Ramsay principle can have no 
application.”34 
 
Finally, Lord Hoffmann noted that even if a statutory provision is being interpreted 
having regard to business concepts it is still possible for the taxpayer to enter into a 
transaction for purely tax reasons.  The only issue is whether the taxpayer has satisfied 
the specific statutory test: 
“Even if a statutory expression refers to a business or economic 
concept, one cannot disregard a transaction which comes within the 
statutory language, construed in the correct commercial sense, simply 
on the ground that it was entered into solely for tax reasons.  Business 
concepts have their boundaries no less than legal ones.”35 
3.5.7 Dandelion Investments revisited  
It would appear that McGrath J was concerned about the absence any “real 
investment” financed from the borrowed money.  Throughout his judgement his 
Honour stresses the mismatch between the deductible interest and the non-assessable 
dividend and the fact that the tax saving associated with the interest deduction 
converted a cash loss into an after tax net gain.  His Honour also stresses the fact that 
the subsidiary company, which was used to acquire the UK target company, was an 
empty shell.  The case raises a numbers of questions including how would His Honour 
have approached the question of the application of section BG 1 if the facts had been 
slightly different?  For example, it is not difficult to envisage a scenario where the 
borrowed money is used to fund a real investment.   
 
3.6 A double dip 
3.6.1 The structure 
The following Diagram illustrates how it is conceptually possible for a New Zealand 
company to incorporate two Cook Island subsidiaries.  The first Cook Island 
subsidiary would be funded fully with equity capital from the parent (2).  That equity 
capital would be financed by the first loan borrowed from a New Zealand bank (1).  
An interest deduction would be available because the borrowed funds were used to 
subscribe for capital in the first Cook Island company. The proceeds of the share issue 
would be used by the first Cook Island company to lend the money to the second 
Cook Islands company (3).  That company would then on-lend the funds back to the 
New Zealand bank (4).  However, the loan would be deposited with the offshore 
branch of the New Zealand bank.  The offshore branch would use the loan to make a 
second loan to the taxpayer (5), who used the proceeds to fund a real investment (6).   
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Diagram 6: A Double Deduction  
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3.6.2 Tax saving and cost of funds 
Assuming the taxpayer (1) borrowed $100,000 @ 10% (2) receives a dividend from 
Cook Islands company equivalent to the interest on the first loan, and (3) is subject to 
a tax rate of 48% (the rate applicable in 1984) the net result of the scheme from the 
taxpayer’s viewpoint is: 
 
 Interest paid on first loan $10,000 
 Interest paid on second loan $10,000 
 Total tax deduction ($20,000) 
 Less tax at 48%  $(9,600) 
 After tax interest cost $10,400 
 Less inter-company dividend (exempt) ($10,000) 
 Net borrowing cost $400 
 Effective tax rate 0.004% 
 
Thus the above scheme has reduced the cost of borrowing in a completely artificial 
manner, at the expense of the New Zealand tax base. 
 
3.6.2 Would Dandelion strike down this structure? 
How would McGrath J react to this hypothetical structure?  Would his Honour allow 
an interest deduction and if so, how much?  Presumably his Honour would allow the 
second interest deduction because the funds can be traced to the real investment, and 
therefore the criteria of section DD 1(1)(b)(i) is satisfied. 
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But what about the first loan?  Once again any attempt to disallow that deduction 
would be based on a reading into (via section BG 1) section DD 1(1)(b)(iii) of an 
additional criteria that is simply not apparent from the statutory test.  Would it make 
any difference if the taxpayer could demonstrate that but for the double deduction and 
the positive impact it had on the cost of funds, the investment would not have 
proceeded?  In other words, the investment is not financially viable at an implicit 
interest rate of 10% whereas it could only be undertaken at an effective interest rate of 
0.004%.  Lord Hoffmann’s observation in MacNiven seems applicable: 
But when the statutory provisions do not contain words like 
‘avoidance’ or ‘mitigation’ I do think that it helps to introduce them.  
The fact that steps taken for the avoidance of tax are acceptable or 
unacceptable is the conclusion at which one arrives by applying the 
statutory language to the facts of the case.  It is not a test for deciding 
whether it applies or not. 
4. An historical overview and summary of the current CFC/FIF regime 
4.1 Introduction 
Prior to 1 April 1988 New Zealand resident companies and individuals were only 
liable to pay New Zealand income tax on overseas sourced income if and when they 
derived it.  Taxpayers were not liable to pay tax upon the income derived (and 
returned) by a non-resident entity, even if that entity was under the complete control 
of a New Zealand taxpayer and that taxpayer was the only person entitled to receive 
or use that foreign sourced income. 
 
Accordingly, it was a relatively simple exercise for a New Zealand resident company 
and/or individual to accumulate income in an offshore entity and pay little (if any) 
New Zealand income tax on that offshore income.  However, the New Zealand 
resident was able to enjoy the benefit of that income in a tax free form, for example 
by selling the shares in the company.   
 
The ability of New Zealand resident companies to defer or avoid the payment of 
income tax ended on 1 April 1988 when the original CFC and FIF regimes came into 
effect.  The original CFC regime applied to a list of 61 low tax jurisdictions and 
specified types of companies in nine other jurisdictions.  The current regime came 
into effect on 1 April 1993.  The original FIF regime was also enacted with effect 
from 1 April 1988.  However, it was deferred until 1993 when it was replaced with 
the current FIF regime.   
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4.2 Passive income companies 
 
Diagram 7 - Passive income : companies 
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A typical example of how easy it was for a New Zealand company to avoid New 
Zealand income tax on a passive source of income prior to CFC/FIF regime is 
outlined in the scenario summarised in Diagram 7.  Briefly, the parent company 
wishes to invest surplus funds in New Zealand government stock (NZGS).  Clearly 
the net interest income is subject to corporate income tax because it has a source in 
New Zealand.  However, it is possible for the parent company to eliminate the prima 
facie income tax expense by using the funds to subscribe for share capital in a tax 
haven subsidiary (1).  The tax haven subsidiary could use the proceeds of the share 
issue to its parent company, to deposit the funds with the offshore branch of a New 
Zealand bank (2).  That branch would use the funds to acquire the NZGS (3).   
 
Briefly, the income tax consequences of the transaction are as follows.  The payment 
of any interest and discount (a) arising from the NZGS is income, which clearly has a 
New Zealand source and is paid to a New Zealand resident taxpayer.  There is no 
obligation to deduct NRWT, because section OE 4(1)(n)(i) of the Act (and the 
equivalent to the 1976 Act) specifically provides that the ordinary source rule 
contained in section S OE 4 (1)(h) does not apply in the case of interest derived by the 
offshore branch of a New Zealand taxpayer, provided that the interest was derived in 
the course of the business carried on by that taxpayer.  The net income derived by the 
offshore branch (in this example 1%) is subject to New Zealand income tax.  The 
payment of interest (b) and principal by the offshore branch to the tax haven 
subsidiary is a transaction, which does not create any New Zealand source income and 
involves a non-resident taxpayer.  Accordingly, that aspect of the transaction is not 
subject to New Zealand tax.  The final step of the transaction is the payment of a 
dividend by the tax haven subsidiary to its New Zealand parent (c).  That dividend 
was exempt from income tax under the inter company dividend as it existed prior to 
the 1992 amendments to the equivalent of section CB 10 in the 1976 Act.  There can 
be little doubt that the above sequence of events is detrimental to the New Zealand 
corporate tax base and remedial legislation was clearly required.   
 
Tax haven - sub Offshore branch 
Parent company New Zealand  
Government 
stock 
New Zealand bank 
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A variation on a theme is summarised in Diagram 8. 
 
Diagram 8 – Passive income companies 
 
  (3) dividend 
 
 
 
 
 (4) distribution (2) rent/lease payments 
 corpus 
   (1) sale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Briefly, the parent company could establish a trust located in a tax haven, which in 
turn established a subsidiary in a tax haven.  That subsidiary would then purchase 
New Zealand based assets from the parent company (1).  The purchase would be 
funded by an interest free loan repayable on demand.  That loan did not create any 
deemed dividend implications.  Subject to the general anti avoidance provision, any 
payment by the parent company for the use and enjoyment of the asset (2) would 
create an allowable deduction and depending on the nature of the asset, may not create 
a liability to NRWT.   
 
 
4.3  Passive income individuals 
 
Diagram 9 - Passive income : individuals 
 
  (b) 11% interest 
 
  (2) deposit 
 
 (3) purchase 
 
 
 (1) Settlement (a) 12% interest 
(c) Corpus 
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CFC/FIF ARTICLE 
   29 
So long as the tax haven trust did not distribute any current year income (sourced 
from the dividend received from the Hong Kong subsidiary (3)) to the parent 
company, the distribution was not subject to New Zealand income tax.  Cases such as 
Lutterill36 established that income that was not distributed to a beneficiary formed part 
of the trust’s corpus (c).  Prior to the introduction of the current trust regime, 
distributions of corpus were not subject to income tax and therefore the parent 
company could derive in a tax free form the deduction originally paid to the Hong 
Kong company. 
 
Following the repeal of exchange control, there were no tax or regulatory barriers to 
prevent an individual from setting up a trust located in a tax haven.  The individual 
could become the settlor and one of the beneficiaries.  Often a related party would 
undertake the functions of the trustee.  The proceeds from the settlement could be 
used by the tax haven trust to invest in NZGS via the offshore branch of the New 
Zealand individual’s New Zealand bank.  The tax consequences were in substance the 
same as for the transaction outlined in para 4.2.  Alternatively, an individual could 
undertake the same transaction via the incorporation of a tax haven company.  The 
opportunity to incorporate a non-resident trust clearly justified the enactment of the 
current trust regime, which focuses on the role played by a New Zealand settlor.  This 
article does not examine the current effectiveness of the settlor regime.  
 
4.4 Objectives of a CFC regime 
The scenarios outlined in paragraphs 4.2 and 4.3 provide a helpful backdrop to 
identify the range of attributes that a robust CFC regime should contain if it is to 
successfully counter those types of tax strategies.   
 
There is a large body of international tax precedent to choose from.  According to 
Arnold and Dibout37 as at 1 January, 2001 23 countries had adopted CFC regimes.  
They include most members of the OECD and the major capital exporting countries.  
Contrast the current position with the state of affairs, which existed 15 years earlier.  
In 1986 only seven countries had enacted comprehensive CFC regimes.38 
 
One of the common objectives of all CFC regimes is to prevent a resident from 
deferring or postponing tax on foreign sourced income.  Most countries, which have 
enacted CFC regimes, tax their residents on their worldwide income.  Secondly, those 
countries treat non-resident entities and controlled foreign entities as separate from the 
resident shareholders, which creates the opportunity for residents to defer or postpone 
resident country taxation on foreign source income.   
 
Finally it should be noted that a CFC regime is only part of a comprehensive 
legislative solution.  Many countries have also enacted transfer pricing, thin 
capitalisation and FIF rules.  There are often exchange controls restrictions, in 
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addition to general anti avoidance provisions and a comprehensive corporate 
residence test.   
 
4.5  Design Parameters for a CFC regime 
Most countries, which have enacted CFC regimes, use the following three features to 
determine which CFCs should be subject to domestic legislation.39   
 
- Does the CFC subject to a lower rate of foreign tax derive the income?, 
- Does the CFC primarily passive as opposed to active or business income 
derive the income?, 
- Does a resident control the CFC?. 
 
The legislative answers to these three questions reflect a wide range of possible 
solutions.  For example in relation to the first attribute how should the tax comparison 
be undertaken?  The simplest approach would be to base the comparison on nominal 
rates of tax.  If, for example, the rate of tax in the foreign country was less than 75% 
of the home country corporate rate, then the regime could apply.  At the other end of 
the spectrum countries such as France and the United Kingdom have attempted to 
base the comparison on the actual tax burden of the foreign company and what would 
have been the tax payable if French and United Kingdom domestic law applied to that 
entity.   
 
Similar issues arise in relation to the second common attribute, i.e. the active/passive 
distinction.  Passive income is the primary focus of all CFC regimes that target 
interest, dividends, royalties, rent, and capital gains.  However passive income can be 
defined in numerous ways, which reflect the difficult issues that arise at the margin.  
Is interest earned by a financial institution and rent derived by a property owning 
company active or passive income?  Similar issues arise in relation to capital gains.  
Some countries distinguish between gains associated with an active business as 
opposed to gains arising from the disposal of marketable securities.  The concept of 
‘base company income’ also creates problems.  This phrase refers to income derived 
by a CFC from providing services or selling property outside the home country to 
related parties. 
 
The third design parameter has also created a wide range of legislative responses.  The 
primary question is what level of shareholder participation or control in the CFC is 
required before the legislation applies.  Secondly, if the CFC is subject to domestic 
legislation, what level of shareholding is required before the shareholder must include 
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in their domestic income, income from the CFC.  Finally the scope of constructive 
ownership rules also creates a divergence in legislative approaches.   
 
How then were these issues dealt with in the New Zealand context? 
 
4.6 Objectives and design parameters for a FIF regime 
Similar considerations arise in relation to the FIF regime that was designed to 
complement the CFC regime.  For example, both regimes share a common grey list of 
seven countries and both regimes are supported by the trust rules.  Furthermore, both 
regimes are part of a wider international tax package which now includes thin 
capitalisation, interest allocation rules, transfer pricing, foreign dividend withholding 
payment rules, underlying foreign tax credit, and the approved issuer levy regime.   
 
There are two broad approaches40 to defining the objectives of a FIF regime.  The first 
approach views an FIF regime as an extension of the relevant CFC rules in that it is 
targeted at reducing the scope for possible tax deferral.  The alternative view is that 
the FIF regime is part of an all-inclusive system that is targeted at taxing passive 
income.  The Australian equivalent regime is aimed at ensuring an equal treatment 
between foreign passive income and Australian passive income, whereas the Canadian 
regime contains an anti avoidance focus in that it only applies if there is an intention 
to avoid Canadian income tax.  The New Zealand experience with FIFs suggests that 
elements of both objectives were included in the design parameters.   
 
Another important issue is the scope of the regime.  Which of the following categories 
of offshore investment should be subject to a FIF regime,   
- Interests in offshore investments such as unit trusts, mutual funds, and 
entities such as open ended investment companies.   
- Non controlling interests in companies resident in low jurisdictions. 
- Non-controlling interests in companies resident in high tax jurisdictions. 
 
The latter two categories of investment are likely to pose a greater threat than the 
third.  That category would not appear to justify the administration and compliance 
costs of an FIF regime. 
 
A third issue is the taxation of a New Zealand resident's investment in the FIF.  The 
taxpayer does not have control over the FIF and therefore will experience difficulties 
in obtaining information.  What type of surrogate or proxy should be developed to 
approximate the tax consequences of a comparable domestic investment?.  The range 
of possibilities includes an imputed or deemed rate of return, taxing the change in 
value, or merely taxing distributions and/or realised gains on disposal.   
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4.7 History of the regimes  
A lengthy consultative process and the deferral of the FIF regime preceded the current 
international tax regime.  The transactions and structuring summarised above clearly 
demonstrated how it was possible to effectively trap offshore income in a tax haven, 
which was not subject to New Zealand income tax.   
 
Diagrams 6, 7, 8, and 9 demonstrate the consequences of financial deregulation.  This 
created opportunities for companies and individuals to avoid New Zealand income tax 
via the use of non-resident entities located in tax havens.  The introduction of the 
taxation of financial arrangements on an accrual basis meant that international 
structures were the only effective way of avoiding New Zealand income tax on, for 
example, the discount associated with an investment in NZGS which prior to the 
enactment of the accrual regime was exempt from New Zealand income tax.  Those 
types of structure were also used to avoid the adverse impact of changes to the 
taxation of superannuation funds and life insurance companies.   
 
4.7.1 22 December 1986 
The consultative process began with an announcement by the then Minister of 
Finance (the Honourable R O Douglas) that the existing penalty regime would be 
amended to apply to offshore transactions, which were caught by the predecessor of 
section BG 1 of the Act.  The applicable penalty would be calculated at twice the 
normal rate with effect from the date the tax liability would have been payable if the 
avoidance arrangement had not been entered into.  The new proposed penalties would 
apply from the 1985 income year although no penalty would be imposed on taxpayers 
who disclosed any tax avoidance arrangements prior to 31 March 1987. 
 
4.7.2 The 1987 budget 
The 1987 budget was delivered on 18 June.  The government outlined a number of 
proposals, which were aimed at tax havens.  The legislation would be based on the 
provisions, which were in force in other countries.  The general thrust was that 
passive investment income and income from transactions with related parties would 
be subject to New Zealand income tax in the same year in which the transaction 
occurred.  The Minister stated that avoidance of New Zealand income tax from the 
use of tax haven entities was “one of the most serious remaining problems with 
existing income tax provisions. … [that legislation] would be aimed at arrangements 
where there is a strong presumption that they would not exist if it were not for tax 
avoidance considerations”.41   
 
To achieve these objectives, the budget proposed to tax New Zealand residents on 
their share of “tainted income” of foreign companies where that income was subject to 
tax at a rate that was significantly lower than the New Zealand applicable tax rate.  
Tainted income would include passive investment income and income associated with 
transactions entered into with related parties.  The budget statements specifically 
noted that the proposals “would not affect companies in countries having moderate to 
high corporate tax rates, nor certain active income derived from certain operations (eg 
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manufacturing) in low tax countries”.  The budget statement indicated that the 
applicable legislation would be based on the experience of other comparable 
countries, which had enacted comprehensive anti tax haven legislation, which was 
effective in preventing the worst and most visible forms of international tax 
avoidance.   
 
The proposed measures would apply to a controlled foreign company, which was 
defined as an entity in which five or fewer New Zealand residents owned more than 
50%. Those shareholders would be taxed on their proportionate share in the controlled 
company’s income calculated in accordance with New Zealand principles.  This 
became the “branch equivalent” method.   
 
Finally, the budget statement noted that the government was preparing a consultative 
document, which would be considered by a consultative committee that would hear 
submissions from interested parties and advise the government on the implementation 
of the reforms.   
 
4.7.3 Consultative document, December 1987 
The consultative document (CD) broadened the original objective announced in the 
1987 budget.  In the preface to the CD, the Minister of Finance stated that the reforms 
were designed to achieve two inter-related objectives: 
 
- protection of the New Zealand tax base by preventing residents from avoiding or 
deferring tax on their foreign source income, and 
- to remove artificial incentives for taxpayers to invest offshore, and/or to invest in 
a particular form of offshore investment.  
 
The first objective (protecting the New Zealand domestic tax base) was a restatement 
of the June budget announcement.  The second objective was designed to include 
questions of economic efficiency.  If the New Zealand tax system favoured offshore 
investment over an equivalent domestic investment there would be an artificial 
incentive for New Zealand residents to invest offshore.   
 
A second underlying objective was to ensure that any investment decision was based 
on commercial considerations rather than the comparable income tax treatment.  This 
principle would apply to both active and passive forms of income.  The CD noted that 
both objectives would be achieved via two methods of taxation, the branch equivalent 
(BE) method and the comparative value method.   
 
4.7.4 Branch equivalent method 
The BE method would tax taxpayers on their pro rata share of the income derived by a 
non-resident company in which they had a direct or indirect interest.  Affected 
taxpayers would be required to calculate their assessable income in accordance with 
applicable New Zealand tax principles. 
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4.7.5 The comparative value method 
If a taxpayer could not obtain sufficient information to undertake a BE calculation, the 
CD proposed taxing them under the CV method.  The proposal would tax a taxpayer 
on their net cash withdrawals from the foreign entity plus the difference between the 
market value of the entity at the beginning and end of the income year.  Accordingly, 
the CV approach would impose a form of taxation on accrued capital gains 
irrespective of any underlying cash flow received by the taxpayer. 
 
Clearly the CV method would impose a higher effective rate of tax than the BE 
method.  This followed from the fact that the CV method would include all accrued 
gains whereas the BE method only included capital gains that would have been taxed 
under comparable New Zealand principles.  A second significant difference between 
the two methods related to the proposals on foreign tax credits.  Under the CV 
method, a New Zealand resident would only receive the benefit of a deduction for any 
foreign income tax paid.  Under the BE proposal taxpayers could claim a credit for 
any foreign tax paid by the entity.   
 
4.7.6 The March 1988 Report of the Consultative Committee 
The Committee endorsed the anti avoidance and economic utility objectives which 
were two of the guiding principles reflected in the Consultative Document.42  The 
Committee agreed that in the long run New Zealand would be best served by an 
efficient tax system, which was neutral as between domestic and foreign investment.  
The Committee accepted the designed parameters outlined by an earlier Consultative 
Committee which had considered the taxation of controlled entities via the BE 
method.   
 
However, the Committee strongly criticised the proposed CV method because it was 
inconsistent with a number of other important tax policy objectives.  The business 
community was strenuously opposed to what would have been the introduction of a 
capital gains tax on unrealised gains.   
 
The CV method is not defended in the CD as a capital gains tax.  There 
is no discussion of the fundamental design issues associated with such 
a tax, such as whether it should tax only real or nominal gains and 
whether it should apply on an accrual or realisation basis.  Given the 
novelty of the CV proposal, its lack of any international precedent, its 
valuation problems, its cash flow consequences and the absence of a 
convincing justification for it in the CD, it is not surprising that the 
proposal found no support amongst those who made submission.43 
 
The Committee concluded that the CV method outlined in the CD failed to place 
sufficient regard on the conventional criteria for evaluating taxation proposals, namely 
equity, efficiency and certainty.   
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In the case of foreign entities, which were not subject to the CFC/BE regime, the 
Committee outlined a proposal which would balance the objectives of preventing tax 
avoidance and deferral plus achieving economic neutrality in a manner which retained 
taxpayer goodwill (voluntary compliance).  To achieve this balance of objectives the 
report concluded that a CV regime could only be: 
 
justified where there is a serious avoidance problem that exists or can 
reasonably be expected to develop.  Outside that area and CFCs, the 
taxation of gains, other than dividends, that residents derive from 
offshore investments should await the introduction of a general capital 
gains tax.  In the Committee’s view, minor or non-controlling 
shareholdings in companies resident outside tax havens clearly fall in 
the category of investments that are best taxed under a capital gains 
tax. … Offshore funds, especially those located in tax havens are 
clearly the biggest avoidance problem.  The Committee therefore 
favours the introduction of a foreign investment fund regime targeted 
at investment vehicles, which confer significant tax benefits, such as 
unit trusts based in tax havens.44 
 
4.7.7 The original legislation 
The Income Tax Amendment Act 1988 (No 5) introduced Part IV A into the Income 
Tax Act 1976.  The principles, which were enacted in 1988, are generally speaking 
still applicable in 2003.45  Briefly, the CFC regime applies to any foreign company in 
which five or fewer New Zealand resident taxpayers control 50%  of the share capital.  
The main exception was for entities, which are resident in the six grey list countries.  
In the case of any CFC which was not resident in a grey list country, the resident New 
Zealand individuals were assessable on their pro rata share of the annual income of 
the CFC where they own an income interest of 10% or greater.  The CFC’s income 
was calculated on the same basis as if it was a foreign branch of a New Zealand 
resident company.   
 
Any foreign tax paid by the CFC is creditable up to the amount of the New Zealand 
income tax payable on that income.  However, foreign tax credits did not flow 
through as imputation credits.   
 
The 50% control test was subject to a series of complex “look through” rules, which 
defined control as the aggregate of a person’s direct, and indirect control interest in 
addition to the interests of associated persons and nominees.  The “look through” 
rules were designed to prevent a New Zealand resident from dispersing their interest 
in a controlled foreign company thereby circumventing the negative impact of the 
regime.46   
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The original FIF regime reflected the principles contained in the recommendations of 
the Consultative Committee.47  The regime should be targeted at non-resident entities, 
which fall outside the CFC/BE regime because they provide taxation benefits, which 
do not depend on the concept of a control or income interest, which are pivotal to the 
CFC regime.  However, the Committee stressed that the FIF regime should be 
targeted only at non-resident entities, which provide significant tax advantages that 
are not available from comparable New Zealand, based entities.  Accordingly, they 
were primarily concerned with, for example, a unit trust based in a tax haven, which 
invested in debt securities (including New Zealand securities), which would offer a 
significant advantage, compared to any New Zealand investor who subscribed for 
units in a comparable New Zealand unit trust.  Their recommendations were based on 
an examination of the Canadian regime, which was primarily targeted at tax haven 
funds, which were previously marketed in Canada.  The Committee’s 
recommendations were based on two key criteria. 
 
· that the income or change in value of the entity was primarily derived from 
holding or trading portfolio investments in shares, investments in debt 
instruments, real property, commodities, royalty agreements, etc and  
· the effect of the residence of the entity and its distribution policy is to reduce the 
tax payable on the income below what it would have been had the income been 
taxed in New Zealand as if it were derived by a New Zealand resident investor. 
 
The original legislation provided that all interests of a New Zealand resident in a 
foreign entity that is not a CFC is an FIF and subject to the regime unless they qualify 
under one of four exceptions.48  The exceptions were:  
 
· the foreign entity is resident in one of the six grey list countries 
· the foreign entity paid foreign tax of at least 20% of their income 
· the foreign entity distributed at least 60% or more of their total income49 
· at the end of the accounting year, the foreign entity assets consisted of no more 
than 40% of the following: 
· an income interest in a CFC of greater than 25% 
· rights as a beneficiary under a trust 
· rights as a partner in a partnership 
· FIF interests 
· financial arrangements 
· annuities 
· rent producing land 
· royalty producing assets 
· rights or options to acquire or dispose of any of the above categories of assets. 
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Any New Zealand resident taxpayer who had the misfortune to hold an interest in an 
FIF was taxed upon any increase in the value of their interest in the FIF taking into 
account both revenue and capital gains both realised and unrealised. 
 
4.7.8 Deferral of the FIF regime 
The brief summary of the original regime highlighted its inherent complexity and the 
difficulty a non-portfolio investor would face in trying to obtain relevant information 
to determine whether they satisfied one of the four exemptions.  The original 
legislation attempted to introduce the distinction between active/passive income with 
the regime applying only to passive income, which was not distributed to New 
Zealand resident investors in a taxable form.  A second deficiency with the original 
regime was that there was only one method of calculating income (comparative value) 
and that method assumed that all investors could obtain the market value of an FIF 
interest.  That was clearly not the case.  Accordingly, the previous regime never 
permanently came into effect and was ultimately repealed and replaced with the 
current regime, which applies to all interests held in an FIF on 1 April 1993. 
 
5. The current CFC and FIF regimes – main criticisms 
5.1  The  current CFC Regime  
5.1.1 Introduction 
There is one major difference between New Zealand’s CFC and the equivalent 
regimes enacted by the seven grey list countries.  The New Zealand regime does not 
and never has contained an active income exemption.  According to Arnold and 
Dibout,50 as at 1 January 2001 twenty-three countries had adopted a CFC regime.  
Those countries include most of the major members of the OECD and a number of 
New Zealand’s major trading partners.  However, only three countries did not provide 
an active income exemption.  They are:  
 
- Hungary 
- New Zealand  
- Sweden. 
 
Similar criticisms can be made about the current FIF regime.  An individual taxpayer 
if considering a domestic equity investment and an identical investment in a non-grey 
list FIF would for tax reasons always choose the domestic investment.  There can be 
no doubt that the FIF regime contains an inbuilt bias against offshore investment.  
Secondly, there is a significant range of tax outcomes associated with each of the four 
methods contained in the current FIF regime.  The primary difference between a 
domestic investment and the identical FIF investment is the fact that the latter regime 
contains various forms of a capital gains tax.  Generally speaking, there is no 
comparable tax impost associated with the domestic investment.   
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5.1.2  Active income exemptions 
According to Arnold,51 most countries, which have adopted the transactional 
approach, provide an active income exemption because only tainted income is 
attributed to the resident shareholders.  Generally speaking tainted income 
encompasses base company income and passive income.  Countries, which have 
adopted the jurisdictional approach, provide a defacto active income exemption, 
because of an exemption for a CFC located in a high tax country.  Finally, countries, 
which have adopted the entity approach, provide an exemption for any CFC that is 
engaged primarily in industrial and commercial activities or that its income is 
primarily derived from active business income.   
 
To paraphrase the words of the McLeod Committee, according to Arnold,52 New 
Zealand certainly stands out from the rest of the crowd.   
 
Only three countries – Hungary, New Zealand and Sweden – do not 
make any distinction between tainted and other income for the 
purposes of their CFC rules.  This aspect of the Hungarian, New 
Zealand and Swedish rules is remarkable.  For them, the only relevant 
factor in determining whether a CFC’s income is attributed to its 
resident shareholders is the rate of foreign tax in the country in which 
the CFC is resident.  Thus, for New Zealand, all of the income of a 
CFC that is resident in a country other than one of the seven grey list 
countries will be attributed to its New Zealand shareholders even if the 
CFC is engaged exclusively in an active business such as 
manufacturing or mining.  (emphasis added). 
 
5.1.3 The active/passive boundary 
Given that 20 out of 23 countries have adopted a passive income exemption it is 
interesting to speculate on why New Zealand has consistently resisted calls for the 
implementation of a similar exemption.  A brief examination of the country 
summaries contained in Arnold indicates that the 20 countries define passive income 
differently. However, it usually includes dividends, interest, rent, royalties, and often 
capital gains.  A number of CFC regimes contain an exemption for interest and rent 
where it is clearly part of an active business.  An obvious example is interest earned 
by a financial institution and rent derived by a property investment company.  
 
Similar issues arise in relation to interest and dividend income derived by a CFC from 
transactions with other related parties.  Dividends are generally considered to be 
prima facie passive income.  However dividends received by a CFC from another 
CFC could become subject to double taxation.  Accordingly, many regimes contain a 
mechanism to avoid double taxation.  Similar issues arise in respect of interest income 
derived by a CFC from related parties. 
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5.1.4 Base company income 
Arnold53 uses this term to describe income derived by a CFC from transactions, which 
occur outside the country in which the CFC is resident, but are from transactions with 
related parties.  Base company income is targeted because there is a prima facie 
inference that the reason for the transactions is to avoid domestic tax rather than to 
ensure international competitiveness.  Treating base company income as tainted for 
CFC purposes overcomes the practical difficulties of attempting to apply transfer-
pricing rules to those transactions.  The most common forms of base company income 
are insurance and reinsurance premiums, and income from shipping and air transport 
activities.   
 
5.1.5 The capital revenue boundary 
Arnold54 contains a useful summary of the range of mechanisms used by different 
countries to limit the scope of the active income exemption to ensure that it is not 
used as a device to convert what would ordinarily be considered passive income into 
active income.  The various tests are comparable to the range of judicial techniques 
adopted by the New Zealand courts to define the capital/revenue boundary.  Recent 
examples include: 
 
− Lease inducements.55  
− Restrictive covenants. The approach taken by the Court of Appeal in CIR v 
Henwood56 and CIR v Fraser57 clearly demonstrate that the courts have had 
little difficulty in distinguishing between cases which have held that an 
inducement and/or a restrictive covenant related to income from employment 
from situations where the transaction was on capital account 
 
− The business of investing/dealing in shares.  Recent decisions of the Court of 
Appeal include CIR v Rangatira58 and National Insurance Co Ltd v CIR.59  
Those decisions are consistent with the seminal decision of the Court in 
National Distributors.60  The distinction between investing and dealing has 
been recognized IRD in a series of well-known public binding rulings that 
distinguish between actively managed and passive investment funds.   
 
− Pre-1973 Land sale cases.  There is a long line of cases in which the New 
Zealand courts have successfully dealt with the capital revenue boundary in 
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 CIR v Henwood (1995) 17 NZTC 12,271. 
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the context of transactions involving land.  See for example CIR v Walker61 
and CIR v Eunson.62  
 
The approach taken by the New Zealand courts in these cases strongly suggests that 
our judicial system is capable of taking a realistic and robust approach to any 
legislation, which defines the outer limits of an active income exemption.  The robust 
approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Dandelion Investments strongly suggests 
that a comparable structure would be classified as producing passive income. Both of 
the Europa Oil cases would most likely be classified as involving passive income.   
 
If Parliament was concerned about the fiscal risks of leaving the courts an unfettered 
discretion, then there are a number of approaches adopted by the 20 countries that 
have successfully implemented an active income exemption, which could form a 
useful legislative template for a New Zealand exemption.  They include the 
following:63   
 
- A number of countries have adopted a quantitative requirement, which forms part 
of their active income exemption.  For example Australia provides that active 
income must be at least 95% of the CFC’s total income.  Countries, which 
include France, Japan and the United Kingdom, have adopted a 50% threshold.   
 
- Other jurisdictions have adopted a qualitative test, which focuses on the source  of 
the active business income.  The income must be derived from transactions in 
which the country is resident (known as a local market activity test) and/or from 
transactions with unrelated parties (whether inside or outside the CFC 
jurisdiction). 
 
-   A third approach is to specifically exclude certain types of income or activities.   
For example, the United Kingdom exemption is not applicable to a CFC whose 
main business is in investment or the delivery of goods to and from the United 
Kingdom.  
 
-  A fourth legislative solution is to require the CFC to have a substantial presence in 
the foreign country.  For example, the United Kingdom requires the CFC to 
manage its own business, which means it must have sufficient property and 
employees to carry on the business.  That exemption would not exclude the type of 
shelf company operations disclosed in New Zealand Forest Products NV v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue.64   
 
-  Finally, a number of countries have prohibited certain activities.  For example the 
Japanese active income exemption is not available to a CFC whose main business 
is investment, licensing, or leasing ships or aircraft.   
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 CIR v Walker CIR v. Walker [1963] NZLR 339. 
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5.2 The current FIF regime 
5.2.1 An inbuilt bias 
 
A common criticism of the current FIF regime is that it contains an inbuilt bias in 
favour of New Zealand investment.65  The following Table summarises the extent to 
which non-grey list investments are over-taxed compared with a comparable New 
Zealand domestic investment or an investment in a grey list country.   
 
An inevitable consequence has been the development of tax efficient investment 
structures, which take advantage of the fact that there are no look-through provisions 
in the grey list/non-grey list distinction.  For example, a number of UK based 
investment funds have used their grey list exemption to effectively invest New 
Zealand funds into an extensive range of non-grey list countries.  This type of 
behavioural response to the inherent bias contained in Table B is discussed in further 
detail in section 6. 
 
Table B: Comparative Taxation of Investments  
 
Taxpayer Type Investment 
 NZ Co shares Grey list Co shares Non-grey list Co shares 
Capital account Not taxed Not taxed Taxed 
 NZ passive fund Grey list passive fund Non-grey list passive fund 
Passive index fund Taxed  Taxed Taxed 
 NZ active fund Grey list active fund Non-grey list active fund 
Active fund Not taxed Not taxed Taxed 
 NZ Co shares Grey list Co shares Non-grey list Co shares 
Share trader Taxed Taxed Taxed 
 
 
5.2.2 An illogical range of investment outcomes 
A second common criticism of the current FIF regime is the range of potential 
outcomes arising from the same investment.  This is highlighted in the case of an 
individual who has invested in a non-grey list country with a shareholding of less than 
10%.  Table C contains a hypothetical set of financial results associated with the 
investment.  Each of the figures is used to calculate the underlying income under the 
four current methods.   
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Table C: Comparative Calculations  
 
 Year ended 31 March 2002 Year ended March 2003 
Income interest 8% 8% 
Net after-tax accounting profit  $200,000  -$100,000 
Branch equivalent income  $150,000  -$150,000 
Opening market value  $70,000  $80,000 
Closing market value  $80,000  $60,000 
Opening book value  $50,000  $55,000 
Closing book value  $55,000  $51,000 
Dividends  $5,000  $5,000 
Interest expense  $4,000  $4,000 
 
 
Table D highlights the range of outcomes that are possible associated with a two-year 
investment, which declines in value.   
 
Table D: Comparative Calculations  
 
 Year ended 31 March 2002 Year ended March 2003 
Branch equivalent  $12,000  -$12,000 
Accounting profit  $16,000  -$8,000 
Comparative Value  $11,000  -$19,000 
Deemed rate of return66  $5,230  $5,753 
 
 
5.2.3 Practical considerations 
Finally there are a number of well-known difficulties surrounding the selection of one 
of the four options.  Only if the taxpayer has access to certain types of information are 
the branch equivalent and accounting profit method realistic options.  Furthermore 
some of the methods have monetary limits.  There are significant differences in the 
treatment of tax losses and the availability of foreign tax credits.  The following Table 
summarises these concerns. 
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Table E 
 Comparative value Deemed rate of return Accounting profits  Branch equivalent 
Section of 
Income Tax Act 
1994 
CG 18 CG 19 CG 20 CG 21 
 
When is the 
method used 
Calculation is only of 
the New Zealand 
investor’s share in the 
value of the entity as a 
whole. 
Used when the CV or AP 
methods cannot 
reasonably or practically 
be used and the taxpayer 
is an individual with FIF 
interests of no more than 
$100,000 (market value) 
This method can 
only be used for 
small shareholdings 
in publicly listed 
companies or unit 
trusts. 
Requires access to 
detailed financial 
accounting information 
and for most FIF 
interests the information 
available will not be 
sufficient for this 
method to be used. 
 
 
How is income 
determined? 
Income attributed by 
comparing: (a) market 
value at year end plus 
any gains derived 
during the year (e.g. 
dividends);  less (b) 
market value at end 
previous year plus any 
expenditure incurred in 
the year (e.g. purchase 
of further shares) 
Method takes the book 
value of the taxpayer’s 
investment multiplied by 
a deemed rate of return. 
The after-tax 
accounting profit 
including 
extraordinary gains 
(below the line) of 
the FIF multiplied 
by the percentage 
income interest 
which the New 
Zealand investor 
has in the FIF. 
Income and expenditure 
of the foreign entity is 
calculated as if it were a 
New Zealand taxpayer.  
Income is attribute to 
New Zealand investors 
based on their 
shareholding. 
 
 
Advantage 
The method is available 
for any taxpayer and 
any FIF. 
Simplicity Simplicity Only creates tax 
liability on profits, 
which would also have 
been taxable in New 
Zealand. 
 
 
 
Disadvantage 
Lack of information as 
to the market value of 
the investment.  Taxes 
capital and unrealised 
gains. 
Assumes taxpayer’s 
investment is earning at 
least the deemed rate of 
return.  If the investment 
is performing poorly or 
making losses, this 
method still requires tax 
to be paid on attributed 
income. 
Taxes capital gains, 
which form part of 
accounting income, 
which would not 
normally be taxable 
in New Zealand. 
Complexity. 
 
 
 
Treatment of 
foreign tax 
Gives a tax credit for 
foreign withholding 
taxes deducted from 
dividends received, but 
gives no credit for 
underlying foreign taxes 
paid. 
No credit is given for 
underlying foreign tax 
In effect, a credit is 
given for the foreign 
tax liability as the 
calculation is based 
on after-tax profits. 
Credit is given for 
foreign tax paid. 
 
6. Behavioural responses to the FIF and CFC regime 
6.1 Introduction 
Despite the enactment of a CFC/FIF, trust and FDWT regime is it still possible for a 
company to circumvent those legislative barriers and receive the tax outcomes 
illustrated in Dandelion Investments?  According to one source, the answer is yes.  
Please refer to paragraph 6.5.1 below.  
 
What about individual taxpayers looking for a safe offshore passive investment?  Can 
they avoid the negative impact of the above regimes?  Once again the answer is yes.   
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The following brief analysis of the range of tax planning opportunities should be 
taken into account before any decisions are made about the future direction of any 
reform of the current CFC and FIF regimes.   
 
6.2 OEIC’s  
6.2.1 Background  
 
This acronym stands for Open Ended Investment Company.  According to Smith & 
Turner67 "OEICs are unit trusts in corporate form and the UK counterpart to the 
[European] investment fund that is well known in Luxembourg, France and other 
countries …. [A]uthorised unit trusts, OEICs and investment trusts which are 
"approved" by the UK, Inland Revenue are tax favoured investment vehicles … the 
taxation framework for OEICs is broadly similar to that applying to authorised unit 
trusts."   
 
These have operated out of the United Kingdom since 1997 and were promoted to 
New Zealand investors in early 2000.  OEICs are a tax efficient investment vehicle, 
which enables individual New Zealand investors to pool their funds into a grey list 
entity, which in turn invests in non-grey list countries.  One of the major tax 
advantages of an OEIC is that they are exempt from UK capital gains tax (CGT).  In 
view of the penal nature of the comparative value method, it is hardly surprising that 
New Zealand investors would seek to invest in structures, which overcome the tax 
disadvantages of investing outside the narrow grey list of seven countries.   
 
OEICs are similar to a unit trust in that the investor’s funds are pooled and invested in 
a wide range of cash, bonds and shares. OEICs are limited liability companies and 
therefore the investors hold shares rather than units.  Accordingly, an OEIC can issue 
and cancel shares depending on the level of application and redemptions.  Given that 
the shares are fully backed by the net value of the assets, the current market price of 
the share will reflect the true appreciation and depreciation (if any) of the underlying 
assets.  A second significant advantage of an OEIC is that they fall under the New 
Zealand Securities Commission exemption which means they do not need to have an 
investment statement or prospectus provided other conditions are met which include 
the presentation of a “key features” document to individuals.   
 
6.2.2 Taxation of OEICs 
A number of the United Kingdom based OEICs that have been promoted recently in 
New Zealand were emphasising the capital growth and that there would be few 
dividends to reduce the tax paid on the investment.  Dividends derived by the OEIC 
are taxed at the United Kingdom company rate of 20% and are often automatically 
reinvested.  The emphasis on capital growth is a significant advantage because capital 
gains are, generally speaking, free of tax in the hands of a New Zealand resident 
individual, which is a favourable outcome, compared with the comparative value 
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115, p6. 
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method, which also taxes unrealised capital gains.  Secondly, the OEICs realised 
capital gains are not subject to UK CGT. 
 
6.2.3 OEIC versus a New Zealand unit Trust 
The following Tables demonstrate the tax advantage of an OEIC compared with a 
New Zealand unit trust.  The underlying assumptions are that the funds have been 
invested equally in New Zealand and overseas equities and that both funds offer 
similar returns.  They both expect to generate $800 per annum of which 50% will be 
in the form of capital growth and the remaining 50% will be dividend income that will 
be derived equally from New Zealand and non-New Zealand equities.  The Tables 
include four additional assumptions listed after Table F. 
 
Table F: Investment in an OEIC 
Income 
 Capital Growth 
 NZ dividend income  
 Non-NZ dividend income 
 
 Total income 
 
400 
200 
200 
 
$800 
 
Taxation within an OEIC   
Capital growth 
 Non-taxable 
  
0 
 
 NZ dividend income 
 Dividend 
 FITC 
 
 
200 
35 
 
 
 UK tax @ 20% 
 Less WHT 
 
 Incremental UK tax 
 
47 
(35) 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Non- NZ dividend income 
 Dividend 
 UK tax @ 20% 
 
 
200 
40 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
52 
 
Taxation of distribution from OEIC 
 Total dividend income 
 Less UK tax 
 Net dividend 
 
 NZ taxation @ 39% 
 
400 
(52) 
 
348 
136 
 
 
 
 
 
 
136 
 
Taxation on exiting fund 
 Capital gain 
 
TOTAL TAX PAYABLE 
  
 
  0 
 
188 
 
 
 
The four assumptions:  
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− No withholding tax is imposed on non-New Zealand dividends. 
− The annual capital growth is realised each year. 
− New Zealand dividends are fully imputed.   
− Foreign investor tax credits (FITC) are utilized. 
 
 
Table G:  Investment in a New Zealand Unit Trust  
 
NZ Fund
 
 
 
Capital growth 
 Gains 
 NZ tax @ 33%  
 
400 
132 
 
 
 
132 
 NZ dividend income 
 No tax as dividend is fully imputed 
  
 
 
 
 
0 
Taxation of distribution from unit trust 
 Total distribution 
 Less NZ tax 
 
 
400 
(66) 
 
334 
 
 
66 
 
 
 
 Imputation Credits  
 (66 + 99) 
 Tax @ 39% 
 Less Imputation Credits 
 
165 
499 
195 
(165) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxation on exiting unit trust 
 Capital gain 
 
30 
 
30 
 
TOTAL TAX PAYABLE 
  
228
 
Extra tax (ie 5%)   (40) 
 
 
Capital gains are not taxable in the United Kingdom.  To the extent they are not taxed 
when exiting the OEIC, this represents a significant tax shield compared with New 
Zealand unit trusts.  In the above example the OEIC receives dividend income, and in 
turn pays a taxable dividend to the New Zealand resident investor.  This is an 
important assumption because an OEIC, which merely returns all of its gains in the 
form of an enhanced exit price, could be creating a New Zealand tax liability for the 
New Zealand resident investor.  The question arises whether the units were acquired 
with the purpose of resale at a profit, in particular if there is no prospect of deriving a 
taxable dividend.  This issue also arises with Australian unit trust structures that are 
designed to avoid New Zealand income tax on NZGS. 
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6.3. Australian unit trusts and New Zealand government stock 
 
6.3.1 Introduction  
 
The Minister of Finance’s announcement on 6 August 2003 did not describe how the 
current interface between New Zealand and Australian domestic law enabled an 
individual New Zealand resident to avoid the New Zealand income tax which would 
otherwise have been payable on a direct investment in NZGS.  One possible structure 
would seek to take advantage of the differences in the way in which unit trusts are 
taxed on each side of the Tasman, plus an income conversion mechanism.   
 
6.3.2 Trans-Tasman taxation of unit trusts 
For New Zealand tax purposes a unit trust is deemed to be a company and is taxed in 
accordance with the general principles applicable to non-Qualifying Companies 
(QCs)/Loss Attributing Qualifying Companies (LAQCs).   
 
The position in Australia is similar to the New Zealand trust regime.68  The underlying 
law governing the creation and administration of an Australian trust is similar to the 
equivalent New Zealand provisions.  In both cases a trust is not a separate legal entity 
or a person but is a set of obligations and rights created by the trust deed.  An 
Australian trust may be established as either a discretionary or as a fixed trust.  
Collective investment funds operating as trusts are established as unit trusts, which are 
a subset of a fixed trust because each beneficiary's interest is measured in units.  A 
collective investment unit trust is either closed, i.e. there is a fixed number of units, or 
is open ended where there is no restriction on the size and units maybe redeemed from 
the trust manager or traded on a recognised Australian exchange.   
 
For the purposes of this article, there are no relevant special tax rules that apply to unit 
trusts, which are collective investment funds.  An Australian unit trust is subject to the 
ordinary trust regime.  The equivalent Australian rules are similar to the current New 
Zealand regime in that trustee income is calculated in accordance with the core 
provisions of the Australian Act, and the net income of the trust is either allocated and 
taxed in the hands of the beneficiaries, or in the hands of the trustee.  In the case of 
income allocated to the beneficiaries, there are specific rules, which enable the 
beneficiaries to qualify for any applicable foreign tax credit or franking credit, which 
is attached to the distribution.  Both trans-Tasman regimes deal with the question of 
losses in a similar manner.  The income allocation rules in Australia do not apply to a 
net loss.  There is no Australian mechanism for allocating losses to beneficiaries, 
which is similar to the New Zealand trust regime in which losses are locked in at the 
trustee level but can be carried, forward and offset against future net income.   
 
6.3.3 Australian unit trusts and New Zealand resident taxpayers 
A crucial feature of the current Australian regime, which enables New Zealand 
resident taxpayers to take advantage of an Australian unit trust, is the principle that a 
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non-resident beneficiary is only subject to Australian tax on income, which is 
attributable to sources in Australia.  This principle is contained in section 97(1)69 
which provides that a beneficiary is required to include in their assessable income 
- a share of the net income that is attributable to any period when the 
beneficiary was a resident of Australia irrespective of the source of the 
income, and 
- the share of the net income that is attributable to a period when the 
beneficiary was not a resident of Australia and is also attributable to 
sources in Australia. 
 
In the context of an Australian unit trust, which has acquired NZGS, a distribution to a 
New Zealand resident taxpayer would only be subject to Australian tax if an 
Australian source could be attributable to the interest and/or discount income.  
However, the Australian source rules provide that in the case of interest income the 
source is generally speaking a place where the obligation to pay the interest arose.  In 
other words, the country where the loan contract was made or the credit was first 
made available is the source of the income.  This principle was established in recent 
cases such as Spotless Services Ltd v FCT 70 and is consistent with the leading New 
Zealand case Philips (NV) Gloeilampenfabrieken v CIR 71 
 
6.3.4 New Zealand tax consequences 
From a New Zealand tax perspective there are two issues associated with the New 
Zealand resident's investment in the Australian unit trust.  The first is New Zealand 
withholding tax.  Generally speaking there is no relationship between the individual 
New Zealand shareholders and the Australian unit trust, which are dealing at arm's 
length.  Accordingly, the investment in NZGS would qualify for the 2% approved 
issuer levy regime.  No New Zealand NRWT is payable. 
 
The second issue is the conversion mechanism whereby the distribution from the 
Australian unit trust is treated as a tax-free receipt in the hands of the New Zealand 
resident shareholder.  One simple mechanism would be for the Australian unit trust to 
distribute the net income in the form of non-taxable bonus shares.  For New Zealand 
tax purposes the Act makes a clear distinction between a taxable bonus issue and a 
non-taxable bonus issue.  The latter distribution is specifically excluded from the 
definition of a dividend under section CF 2(3) of the Act.   
 
The only provision, which the IRD could rely on, is section CD 4 of the Act.  That 
provision includes in gross income inter alia any gain derived from the sale of 
personal property, which was acquired for the purpose of resale.  If the Australian unit 
trust does not distribute any of its net income as taxable dividends then the resident 
taxpayer may have considerable difficulty in arguing that any subsequent resale of the 
non-taxable bonus shares fall outside section CD 4.  The application of that provision 
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would depend on the applicability of cases such as National Distributors72 and 
Macmine Pty v FCT 73  
 
Accordingly, from a purely tax planning perspective, a resident New Zealand 
individual investor would be advised to wherever possible invest in an Australian unit 
trust which includes as part of its distribution taxable dividends. 
 
6.4   United Kingdom unit trusts and non-grey list investments 
6.4.1 Background 
 
The Minister of Finance did not, in his August 2003 announcement, discuss the tax 
planning opportunities associated with United Kingdom domiciled unit trusts such as 
Schroder or Foreign & Colonial. 
 
An individual New Zealand resident taxpayer who wishes to invest in a large 
multinational such as Nestlé (based in Switzerland) or a company such as Swire 
Pacific (a major shareholder in Cathay Pacific Airways) is from a New Zealand 
income tax perspective faced with two strategies.  The individual can invest directly 
and in both cases the investment would be subject to the CFC regime on the grounds 
that both the companies are based in two non-grey list countries.  Alternatively, the 
investor could invest in a unit trust that is based in a grey list country, which in turn 
invests in the non-grey list multinational company.  From a purely tax perspective, the 
popularity of grey list based unit trusts can be explained in terms of the narrow scope 
of the grey list, and the adverse tax consequences which follow from a small portfolio 
investment in a multinational company such as Nestlé or Swire Pacific.   
 
6.4.2 Two common examples  
The 2001 Annual Report and accounts of Foreign & Colonial disclose that the twenty 
largest equity holdings constituted 58% (the 2000 year comparable figure was 60%) 
of total assets.  Eighteen of those investments were in non-grey list countries.  Two of 
the investments Deutsche Bank (2.5%) and BASF (1.7%) relate to major German 
multinational companies.  The 2001 Annual Report discloses a list of investments by 
country.  Approximately 88% of the investments were in European countries, which 
are not on the grey list.  In other words, only 12% of the investments were in German 
and United Kingdom companies. 
 
The interim report as at 31 March 2003 for Schroder reveals a similar pattern.  The 
twenty largest investments constituted 58% of shareholders funds.  Given that the 
Schroder fund primarily invests in the Asia Pacific region and that only one country 
(Japan) is on the grey list, it is not surprising that none of the twenty largest 
investments fall within the grey list.   
 
Both of these UK based unit trusts clearly demonstrate the viability of a New Zealand 
individual portfolio investor circumventing the narrow restriction of the grey list (and 
the negative tax consequences) by investing in a grey list domiciled unit trust which in 
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turn invests in an appropriate portfolio of non-grey list equities.  It is not entirely clear 
from the Minister's announcement why this popular investment strategy was not 
discussed.  It would appear that the Minister's primary concern is limited to 
investment strategies which reduce or eliminate the New Zealand income tax which 
would have been payable if the New Zealand investor had made a direct investment in 
a New Zealand asset such as NZGS.   
 
6.4.3 UK taxation of a UK unit trust 
The information for shareholders contained in Foreign & Colonial's 2001 Annual 
Report and accounts states that:  
 
An approved investment trust does not pay tax on capital gains.   
 
Furthermore, note 7 and note 11 indicate that the amount of UK tax payable at the 
corporate rate of 30% was effectively zero because of the relief for foreign taxation. 
 
It would appear from the accounts that a resident New Zealand investor would suffer 
no United Kingdom corporate tax on this investment.  It is also consistent with the list 
of investments based on the country disclosed in the annual report.  Approximately 
1.5% of the investments were held in United Kingdom companies.   
 
The current taxation of a United Kingdom unit trust is also consistent with the 
disclosure contained in Foreign & Colonial's Annual Report. 
 
Foreign & Colonial and Schroeder’s are both authorised unit trusts and are therefore 
exempt from tax on their capital gains.  They are also exempt from tax under 
Schedule D, Case I (of the UK tax legislation) on certain trading income derived from 
futures and option contracts.  Furthermore, capital gains derived from debt securities 
are also exempt from taxation.   
 
Finally, an approved unit trust: 
 
may in certain circumstances distribute their income as if it were a 
payment of yearly interest and, by obtaining a tax deduction for the 
deemed interest payment, effectively pay no UK tax.  … The broad 
intentions of the interest distribution regime are to enable non-UK 
resident investors to receive certain interest and other underlying 
income without imposition of UK tax either within the authorised unit 
trust of by way of withholding by the fund.  Such UK withholding tax as 
may be applied by the authorised unit trust in relation to the 
distribution of other income may be reduced or eliminated under the 
interest article of a relevant double taxation agreement with the UK. 74 
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6.5 How to avoid the CFC regime 
6.5.1 A recent example.  
 
According to a senior IRD official at least one taxpayer has devised a relatively 
simple scheme to circumvent the control and income test.  In September 2000 Robin 
Oliver described the following scheme he could have obtained from an IRD client.75   
 
As previously mentioned, New Zealand levies tax on the worldwide 
income of residents.  This includes income generated through offshore 
subsidiaries.  One attempt to get round this is for a New Zealand 
company to pay an unrelated non-resident bank a sum of money in 
return for the option to purchase, for a minimal amount, shares in a 
New Zealand cash-box subsidiary of the non-resident bank.  The bank 
then invests the sum tax-free in a haven and returns the capital plus 
tax-free interest in the form of share capital in the New Zealand 
subsidiary.  The New Zealand company gains the value of the return of 
capital plus interest when it exercises its option to purchase the 
subsidiary. 
 
This is a remarkable statement because it demonstrates the virtual impossibility of 
protecting the tax base from "trojan horses", such as the scheme described by Oliver, 
which works because it exploits a number of gaps in the New Zealand domestic tax 
base. 
 
6.5.2 A share option 
One possible way of implementing the ideal described above would be for a New 
Zealand resident company to enter into the relationship summarised in the following 
Diagram with an offshore bank. 
 
Briefly, the structure in Diagram 10 would involve the incorporation of a New 
Zealand subsidiary with two classes of shares.  The control or “A” class shares would 
be held by the New Zealand parent company (I).  The voting rights associated with 
the “A” class shares would enable the parent company to effectively control the 
subsidiary.   
 
The New Zealand subsidiary would also issue “B” class shares to the offshore bank 
(2).  Those shares would remain unpaid and would not confer any voting rights until 
they become fully paid shares.   
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 “Capital gains tax – the New Zealand case”, a paper prepared for the Fraser Institute 2000 
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Diagram 10: The scheme mentioned by Oliver. 
 
 Acquire 
 
 
 Redemption 
 
    Pay call $110 on B  
    class shares  
  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 (1) A share $1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
The CFC/FIF regimes contain sufficient legislative barriers to tax any offshore 
investment made by the New Zealand subsidiary.  However, those regimes do not 
apply to a non-resident taxpayer such as the offshore bank, who derives non New 
Zealand source income.  One method of “cashing up” the offshore bank would be for 
the New Zealand parent company to purchase an option from the offshore bank to 
acquire the “B” class shares (3).  In the hypothetical example, the option price would 
be $99 and the offshore bank would use the proceeds from the option to purchase an 
offshore asset or alternatively NZGS.  The tax consequences associated with the 
NZGS is that it would qualify for approved issuer levy and the New Zealand tax on 
the implicit interest income of $10 would be 2%.  From the offshore bank’s 
perspective no New Zealand tax would be payable. 
 
After the NZGS has matured, the offshore bank would use the proceeds to pay up the 
“B” class shares.  Accordingly, the share capital of the New Zealand subsidiary would 
be $110.  The parent company would then pay the excise price of $1 to obtain the “B” 
class shares from the offshore bank.  
 
One method of returning the original investment to the New Zealand parent company, 
would be for the New Zealand subsidiary to repurchase the “B” class shares from the 
parent company for $110.   
 
6.5.3  Income tax consequences of the above arrangement 
The IRD would probably try to tax the implicit interest of $10 by invoking the 
following tax principles and provisions of the Act: 
 
 - The concept of a sham 
 - Business income: section CD 3 
Offshore bank 
NZ Govt 
stock face 
value $110 
NZ Sub NZ Parent Co 
(3) Purchase Option 
B shares $99 
(2) Issue B 
class unpaid 
shares   
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 - Personal property: section CD 4 
 - Financial arrangements : sub part EH 
 - Anti-avoidance : section BG 1 
 
6.5.3.1 The legal nature of an option 
The economic effect of the arrangement summarised above is that the parent company 
invests $100 with the offshore bank, which is used to acquire NZGS, which matures 
for $110, thereby producing a prima facie taxable gain of $10.  This result is achieved 
via the purchase of an option for $99.  Can the IRD attack the transaction on the 
grounds that the option is a sham?   
 
The granting of an option is capable of a simple jurisprudential analysis. The grantor 
(Offshore bank) is in contract law the offeror and the grantee (NZ Parent Co) is the 
offeree.  The grantor irrevocably offers for a specified period of time to hold open for 
acceptance by the grantee the offer to sell the subject matter of the option agreement.  
The offeree during the specified time has the right to accept the offer and thereby 
bring a contract into existence by the exercise of the option according to its terms and 
conditions.  During the period of the option, the grantor/offeror has a contractual 
obligation to the grantee/offeree not to put it out of their power to do what they have 
irrevocably offered to do for the option period.  It is clear law that an option 
agreement retains to the grantor the beneficial ownership of the property, which is the 
subject of the grant unless and until the option is exercised according to its term.  The 
grantor retains the equitable ownership and beneficial enjoyment of the property 
subject to the grant. These principles are summarised in J Sainsbury Plc v 
O’Connor.76   
 
6.5.3.2 Is the option a sham? 
In this example it is clear that there is a high option fee and a minimal payment for its 
exercise.  The overwhelming economic inference is that the grantee will exercise the 
option.  The question becomes whether it is really an option or something else (eg. a 
sham).   
 
It is settled law that for New Zealand income tax purposes the courts have 
consistently required a strict juristic analysis of the contractual arrangements 
according to their actual terms and conditions.  The courts will require the CIR to 
respect the legal form of the transaction according to its terms unless it can be shown 
that the parties had in fact no intention of honouring those terms and that they used 
the documentation as a label to disguise their true purpose, i.e. a tax sham.   
 
It is clear from Diagram 10 that the economic substance is that the grantee will 
exercise the option and that the option price is disproportionately large relative to the 
exercise price but that does not lead to the conclusion that the arrangement is a sham.  
As long as the documentation will enable the grantee of the option to refuse to pay the 
option price of $1 and not to conclude a binding contract the transaction is an option.  
That has a clear and intended contractual consequence and the court would respect the 
party’s intentions.   
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This approach originated in Re Securitibank (No 2) Ltd v CIR77 that has been 
consistently adopted for tax purposes.  There is no longer any ability for the CIR to 
adopt an economic equivalent approach.  The New Zealand Court of Appeal and 
Privy Council have rejected an economic equivalent approach in the following cases: 
 
- CIR v Europa Oil (NZ) Ltd (No 1) [1971] NZLR 641 
- Marac Life Assurance Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (1986) 8 NZTC 
5,086 
- CIR v Henwood (1995) 17 NZTC 12,271 
- Fraser v Robertson [1991] 3 NZLR 257 
- A Taxpayer v CIR (1997) 18 NZTC 13,350 (CA) 
- CIR v Wattie [1999] 1 NZLR 529 
 
In the present context, Marac Life Assurance is relevant.  
 
6.5.3.3 Marac Life Assurance Ltd v CIR 
During the relevant income year proceeds from the disposal of policies of life 
insurance were tax free in the hands of the policyholder.  The top marginal rate of 
personal tax was 66%, whereas life companies were taxed under section 204 of the 
1976 Act at 33%.  Accordingly, from a tax perspective, there was a tax advantage in 
an individual taxpayer investing in NZGS via a life insurance company because there 
was only one layer of tax at half of the top marginal rate. 
 
The ‘trick’ was to structure the form of the transaction as a policy of life insurance 
whereas the economic substance was a loan from the taxpayer to a financial 
institution, which invested the proceeds in NZGS.  The legal mechanism to achieve 
this favourable outcome was a product known as a "Marac Life Bond" (MLB).  A 
MLB contained all of the essential attributes of a policy of life insurance within the 
meaning of section 204 of the 1976 Act.  A crucial feature of a MLB was that if the 
policyholder died before the maturity date, the amount payable under the MLB was 
the single premium plus accumulated bonuses, calculated according to inter alia the 
prevailing rate of interest payable on the NZGS acquired by Marac from the net single 
premium.  The mortality cost of the Life cover was only 0.5% of the premium, and 
this was calculated on the assumption that the average age of the policyholder was 
sixty years. 
 
A strong Court of Appeal78 held that MLB contained all of the essential features 
contained in a contract of endowment assurance.  A MLB could not be classified as a 
sham simply because there was a favourable tax outcome.  Nor could they be 
reclassified for tax purposes based on CIR perception of the so-called substance of the 
relationship between the parties, and the existence of other less tax efficient products 
in the market.  Richardson J said: 
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There is no basis for severing off life insurance and leaving a separate 
lending contract between the investor and Marac.  Each sum payable 
by Marac is a single undivided sum as is the premium payable by the 
investor and there is no warrant for attributing to the parties 
alternative contractual arrangements for the investment of the 
premiums paid.  That being so, and there being no basis for arguing 
that the life insurance benefits were considered by the parties to be so 
totally insignificant as to be brushed aside as a colourable mask (and 
accordingly it is unnecessary to express any legal view as to that), I am 
satisfied that Ongley J was correct in characterising each type of 
Marac life bond as a policy of life insurance for the purposes of the 
Life Insurance Act 1908, and the Income Tax Act 1976 and the 
Securities Act 1978.79 
 
The same type of analysis and reasoning applies ipso facto to the pricing of an option. 
 
6.5.3.4 Business income 
Prima facie, the payment of an option fee by the grantee to the grantor in respect of 
shares in a wholly owned subsidiary is prima facie on capital account. The transaction 
is not part of the ordinary income earning process of the parent company under 
section CD 3.  The situation could be otherwise if the parent company was a financial 
institution and potentially subject to the principles, which deal with the taxation of 
banks and insurance companies and gains, derived from their investment portfolios.  
Even if it could be said that the acquisition of the “B” class shares pursuant to the 
option was part of the revenue account activities of the parent company, that is 
unlikely to create a taxable event.   
 
Case law has consistently held that section CD 4 only applies to gains, which are of an 
income nature, which arise from the ordinary income earning operations of the 
taxpayer.  Secondly, the arrangement summarised above does not produce any taxable 
gain.  The parent company has merely paid $99 for an option to acquire shares with a 
paid up value of $110.  In other words, the parent company has not realised any gain 
from that transaction.  A gain would only arise if the parent company were to dispose 
of the “B” shares, which is unlikely to occur.  If the parent company needed to realize 
its original investment this could be achieved by the subsidiary repurchasing the “B” 
class shares thereby avoiding a sale.   
 
The approach taken by the majority of the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council in 
Wattie would effectively prevent the CIR from successfully arguing that the 
anticipated difference between the acquisition cost of the shares upon the exercise of 
the option ($99) and their anticipated worth at the exercise date ($110) could 
constitute gross income.  Case law has consistently held that unless the taxpayer 
realises the gain, there is no liability under section CD 4.  Cases such as Myer 
Emporium80 are distinguishable on their facts because the implicit gain of $10 is not 
derived for New Zealand income tax purposes. 
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6.5.3.5 A profit making undertaking or scheme 
Could the CIR argue that the anticipated difference of $10 between the cost of the 
shares and their anticipated worth at the exercise date of the option constitutes gross 
income on the grounds that the gain arose from a profit making undertaking or 
scheme within the meaning of the third limb of section CD 4? 
 
There is a clear distinction in terms of the legal nature of the property obtained by the 
grant of an option and what might be called the underlying property acquired when 
that option is exercised.  The CIR may try and argue that where one type of property 
is “swapped” or “exchanged” for another type of property there is a “realisation” for 
income tax purposes if the property is on revenue account.  This is known as the 
California Copper Syndicate principle and is part of New Zealand tax law by virtue of 
the Court of Appeal decision in cases such as Auckland Savings Bank81 and Wattie.  
However, it is highly unlikely that the “B” class shares would be on revenue account 
and therefore this principle is unlikely to apply.   
 
Secondly, the correct analysis of the relationship created by an option is that the 
taxpayer engages in an acquisition, which is the antithesis of either “exchange” or 
“realisation” which gives rise to a taxable event with a third party.  Clear proof of this 
distinction is the case of a taxpayer who purposes trading stock at a bargain price.  
Until the taxpayer either sells or disposes of that trading stock via a transaction with a 
third party, there is no taxable event.  It is inherent in the concept of an acquisition 
that there is no disposition or realisation at that point in time.   
 
This approach is confirmed by the decision of the House of Lords in British South 
Africa Co v Varty. 82  That case concerned an acquirer of options in the course of their 
trade.  The facts involved an option which, when it was exercised, was worth more 
than its acquisition cost and the UK Commissioners sought to tax the difference 
notwithstanding that the shares obtained had not been sold.  The House of Lords held 
that the exercise of an option was not a realisation and did not give rise to a taxable 
event.  Further support for this general approach can be found in two well-known 
Australian cases Macmine83 and Leibler.84  Both those cases can be distinguished on 
their facts, but their conceptual approach is consistent with the decision in Varty.   
 
The closest New Zealand decision is the judgment of Wilson J in A G Healing.85  
Briefly, the taxpayer was granted via a will an option to acquire property at a fixed 
price, which was at the date of death significantly below the current market value of 
that property.  The taxpayer immediately exercised the option, acquired the property 
and contemporaneously sold it at a profit.  The CIR was unsuccessful in his attempt to 
invoke the third limb of section CD 4.  Wilson J held that the events did not disclose a 
profit making undertaking or scheme on the grounds that the taxpayer had merely 
converted a gift obtained under a will (the option) into money.   
                                            
81
 Auckland Savings Bank v CIR [1971] NZLR 569. 
82
 British South Africa Co v Varty (HMIT) [1965] 2 All ER 395 (Varty). 
83
 Macmine Pty Ltd v FCT 1979 ATC 4,133. 
84
 Leibler & Others v FCT 1982 ATC 4,005. 
85
 A G Healing & Co Ltd v CIR [1964] NZLR 222 
CFC/FIF ARTICLE 
   57 
 
6.5.3.6 Myer Emporium and Wattie 
There are a number of passages in the judgement of the High Court of Australia in 
Myer Emporium, which could encourage the CIR to attempt to apply that approach in 
New Zealand.  However, the judgment of the majority of the Court of Appeal and the 
Privy Council in Wattie has effectively reduced the scope of that argument in this 
hypothetical situation.  Both Blanchard J and Lord Nolan posed the rhetorical 
question of whether the taxpayer in Wattie actually derived a gain from the 
interrelated transactions.  All that can be said in the hypothetical scenario is that the 
parent company has acquired shares, which may be capable of producing a gain, but 
until the parent company sells the shares the gain is not realised and accordingly 
nothing is derived for tax purposes. 
 
Furthermore, Myer Emporium can be distinguished on its facts.  The taxpayer in that 
case undertook a transaction, which was part of its ordinary business of providing 
finance to the Myer group of companies.  While the particular transaction was novel 
and unusual in the general context of the taxpayer’s business, it was nonetheless 
entered into as a business transaction in the course of the taxpayer’s ordinary business 
and accordingly the gain was taxable as business income.  Secondly, the taxpayer in 
Myer Emporium realised a gain from the disposal of the right to future income.  The 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation was able to point to a taxable event that involved a 
discrete disposal.  In the hypothetical example, the parent company simply acquires a 
parcel of shares, which at the time of the exercise of the option are worth more than 
the price paid for the option.   
 
6.5.3.7  Financial arrangements – non-residential bank 
It is difficult to see how the CIR could successfully invoke Division 2 of Part EH of 
the Act. There are a series of significant statutory barriers contained in sections EH 21 
to EH 24, which individually and collectively appear to be insurmountable.   
 
The position of the offshore bank is straightforward.  Section EH 21(3) provides that 
the accrual rules contained in Division 2 do not apply to a non-resident who is a party 
to a financial arrangement unless the exception in section EH 21(2) applies.  That 
provision provides that the accrual rules only apply to a non-resident to the extent that 
a financial arrangement relates to a business carried on by a non-resident through a 
fixed establishment in New Zealand.  It would be a relatively simple exercise for the 
offshore bank to arrange the transactions in such a way that they are not attributable to 
the fixed establishment (if any) maintained by the offshore bank in New Zealand.   
 
Assuming that Division 2 does not apply to the offshore bank, it follows that the 
offshore bank is not required to disclose to the CIR how and what the offshore bank 
used the money received from granting the option ($99) for.   
 
Diagram 10 above suggests that the offshore bank will use the $99 to purchase NZGS, 
which will mature at a future date and provide the offshore bank with a ready source 
of funds to pay the call of $110 on the “B” class shares.  The purchase of the NZGS is 
the only aspect of the overall arrangement, which contains any features of a financial 
arrangement.  However, for New Zealand income tax purposes the CIR has no 
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statutory authority to ascertain whether in fact that occurred. Accordingly the CIR is 
not able to apply the accrual rules to the offshore bank that is not subject to New 
Zealand income tax on the gain derived from the purchase and disposal of the NZGS.  
 
6.5.3.8  The definition of a financial arrangement 
Any attempt by the CIR to tax the New Zealand parent company or the New Zealand 
subsidiary under the accrual rules faces the following hurdles.  The first is whether the 
transactions summarised in Diagram 10 above, satisfy the definition of a financial 
arrangement. Section EH 22(1) defines a financial arrangement as:   
 
· a debt or debt instrument, and  
· any arrangement under which a person receives money in consideration for a 
person providing money to any person at a future time or when an event occurs in 
the future. 
 
For the purposes of section EH 22(1), the general definition of “arrangement” 
contained in section OB 1 of the Act applies which as noted above includes any 
contract, agreement, plan, or understanding (whether enforceable or unenforceable) 
including all steps and transactions by which it is carried into effect.  There is no 
doubt that the definition of arrangement and financial arrangement are intended to 
have the widest possible application to any combination of linked or integrated 
transactions.  However, there is a crucial threshold issue, which arises in this case, 
namely whether the integrated arrangement is a financial arrangement within the 
meaning of section EH 22(1) of the Act.  Put at its broadest, can the CIR successfully 
argue that the arrangement is that the offshore bank obtains money (being the 
payment of the option to obtain the “B” class shares) in consideration for a promise to 
provide money being the payment of calls on the “B” class shares (to the New 
Zealand company) at a future date?   
 
6.5.3.9 Is the option agreement a financial arrangement? 
It is difficult to see how the purchase of an option falls within either section EH 
22(1)(a) or (b).  The amount paid by the New Zealand parent to the offshore bank is 
paid in consideration for the offshore bank granting to the New Zealand parent 
company an option to purchase the “B” class shares. The amount is determined 
wholly and solely by reference to the expected future value of the shares.  The value 
attributable to the shares arises by virtue of the offshore bank’s obligation to pay 
future calls on the shares to the value of $110.  
 
Prior to the offshore bank granting the option to the New Zealand parent company, 
the New Zealand subsidiary will issue to the offshore bank the unpaid “B” class 
shares, which carry a future obligation to make calls equal to their par value of $110.  
Those transactions will occur prior to the option agreement being entered into 
between the offshore bank and the New Zealand parent company.  Until those 
transactions have occurred, the offshore bank is not in a position to grant an option in 
respect of those shares.  Accordingly, it cannot be said that the New Zealand parent 
company paid the offshore bank $99 in consideration for a future promise by the 
offshore bank to pay future calls of $110.  The obligation of the offshore bank to pay 
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future calls arose prior to the option agreement.  It therefore follows that the option 
agreement is not a transaction, which falls within the scope of section EH 22(1)(b).   
 
The purchase of the option is not a debt or debt instrument within the meaning of 
section 22(1)(a).  The phrase “debt or debt instrument” is not defined in the Act.  
Accordingly that expression would have its ordinary commercial meaning.  Applying 
the ordinary natural meaning of a debt, the statutory expression embraces sums of 
money which are now payable, or which will become payable in the future, by reason 
of a present obligation. The payment of the option is not a future obligation because it 
is made contemporaneously with the granting of the option.  In other words, the 
concept of a financial arrangement does not include the simultaneous passing of 
consideration by two parties, which will occur under the option arrangement. 
 
Could the Commissioner attempt to apply section EH 22(2) to the payment of the 
future calls of $110?  Similar hurdles appear to face the CIR.  Paragraph (b) of the 
definition applies to an arrangement whereby a person obtains money in consideration 
for a promise to provide money in the future. Therefore the payment of future calls 
could not be regarded as a financial arrangement unless the offshore bank obtained 
money in consideration for the promise to make the future calls.  However, it is clear 
from the sequence of transactions summarised in Diagram 9 above, that the offshore 
bank did not obtain any money under the agreement with the New Zealand subsidiary 
to pay future calls of $110.  The money obtained by the offshore bank arose under a 
subsequent transaction, namely the granting of an option to the New Zealand parent 
company. 
 
Secondly, the payment of future calls is unlikely to satisfy the ordinary meaning of the 
phrase “debt or debt instrument” discussed above.  It would be a relatively simple 
matter for the offshore bank and the New Zealand subsidiary to ensure that the 
offshore bank’s obligation to pay future calls is not a present obligation.  The “B” 
class shares could provide for example that the shareholder is not required to pay a 
call unless and until they receive a notice from the company advising of the payment 
date and the amount of the payment required on that date.  That would ensure that the 
obligation to make a future payment is conditional upon the receipt of the relevant 
notice issued by the subsidiary.  The creation of this type of condition precedent 
would ensure that the future calls are contingent on the production of a notice and a 
contingent amount is not regarded as a debt.  This principle was established in cases 
such as Bennett & Kells.86  
 
 
6.5.3.10 Is an option an excepted financial arrangement? 
Assuming for the purposes of argument only that the transactions summarised in 
Diagram 9 above do create a financial arrangement within the meaning of section EH 
22, the next hurdle faced by the CIR is the definition of an excepted financial 
arrangement contained in section EH 24 of the Act.  In the context of a proposal, 
section EH 24(1)(o) provides that shares or an option to acquire or sell shares are 
excepted financial arrangements.  Generally speaking, an excepted financial 
arrangement is not a financial arrangement and accordingly there is no accrual 
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implications associated with those categories of transaction.  Ever since the accrual 
rules were first enacted in 1986, shares have been treated as excepted financial 
arrangements.  Options to sell or acquire shares have also been treated as excepted 
financial arrangements.  In the present context, there can be no doubt that a properly 
drafted option would satisfy the ordinary commercial meaning of an option.  In 
relation to the “B” class shares, they would satisfy the definition of a share contained 
in section OB(1) of the Act, which is any interest in the capital of a company.   
 
The final hurdle faced by the CIR is the application of section EH 22.  This provision 
deals with the consequences of the broad definition of a financial arrangement.  It 
covers transactions, which could fall within the definition, but include arrangements, 
which must be excluded because of the clear distinction between debt and equity.  
Section EH 22 contains a mechanism which bridges the potential conflict between 
section EH 22 and EH 24.  It is possible that interrelated arrangements, which, if 
considered separately, are not financial arrangements, but because of their 
interdependency could be financial arrangements.  Section EH 22 contains the general 
rule that if an excepted financial arrangement is part of a financial arrangement, then 
any income or expenditure which is solely attributable to the excepted financial 
arrangement is not subject to the principles contained in Division 2.  Section EH 22(2) 
contains a list of exceptions but they do not include excepted financial arrangements 
in the nature of shares or options to acquire shares.   
 
Assuming that the offshore bank is not subject to Division 2, it follows that the 
arrangements outlined in Diagram 10 above do not disclose how the offshore bank 
invested the proceeds from the sale of the option, i.e. in NZGS.  Consequently, the 
only aspects of the arrangement, which the Commissioner can ascertain are the 
granting of the option and the exercise of that option culminating in the New Zealand 
parent acquiring fully, paid “B” class shares from the offshore bank.  There are clearly 
no features of those transactions, which contain any element of a financial 
arrangement.   
 
Finally, the statutory phrase appearing in section EH 22(1) “solely attributable to the 
excepted financial arrangement” creates a further hurdle for the CIR.  Shortly after 
Division 2 was enacted the IRD issued a Tax Information Bulletin (TIB) outlining 
their interpretation of certain aspects of the 1999 amendments.87  In the context of the 
scope of a composite financial arrangement and whether and how aspects are solely 
attributable to an excepted financial arrangement or a financial arrangement, the CIR 
gave a useful example, which shows the difficulty of attempting to link transactions 
entered into by unrelated parties.  If A lends money to B in consideration for which B 
will subscribe for shares in C, the IRD stated that the only financial arrangement is the 
loan between A and B.  The fact that B uses the loan funds to acquire shares in C does 
not mean that the acquisitions of shares are part of a financial arrangement.  The 
shares are treated as an excepted financial arrangement because the subscription and 
dividends flowing from those shares are “solely attributable” to the acquisition of the 
shares.  However, the CIR correctly noted that it is possible for a share buy back 
arrangement to form part of a financial arrangement.  The discussion in the TIB is 
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useful insofar as it shows how difficult it is for the CIR to rely on this provision when 
there is no explicit reference to a financial arrangement.   
 
6.5.3.11 Section BG 1 of the Act 
There are two broad features of the arrangement disclosed in Diagram 9 above, which 
could lead to the CIR attempting to apply section BG 1 of the Act.  The New Zealand 
parent company makes available (via the option) to the non-resident funds, which are 
used by the offshore bank to produce income, which is derived by the non-resident 
rather than the New Zealand parent.  Secondly, the offshore bank enters into a 
transaction which produces a tax free benefit to the New Zealand parent which is 
calculated by reference to the time value of money without that benefit being taxed 
under the accrual rules.  The analysis contained in Section 3 above is also applicable.  
Briefly, it is difficult to see how section BG 1 could be used to cut across the CFC and 
FIF regimes.  There are a number of fundamental threshold requirements, which must 
be satisfied before either regime applies to a New Zealand resident.  There is 
absolutely no prospect that the New Zealand parent company would obtain a control 
or income interest in the offshore bank.  To put it bluntly, the New Zealand parent 
company can obtain the benefits from the arrangement without obtaining any interest 
in the offshore bank.  To do otherwise so would be fatal and that would undermine the 
tax efficiency of the arrangements. 
 
In relation to the accrual rules, a fundamental difficulty faced by the CIR is the clear 
boundary between debt and equity instruments.  This is clear from section EH 24 
which specifically excludes shares and options to acquire shares.  The presence of 
those provisions strongly suggests that there is an explicit recognition within the 
accrual regime rules that if a taxpayer chooses to use an equity instrument to achieve 
their commercial investments, the accrual rules must be applied to the taxpayer 
according to the form of the actual arrangement entered into by the taxpayer.  The 
general tenor of the recent judgment of the Privy Council in Auckland Harbour Board 
creates further difficulties for the CIR.   
 
Finally, it does not follow that if the New Zealand parent had not entered into the 
actual arrangements disclosed in Diagram 10, the New Zealand parent company 
would have directly acquired a parcel of NZGS.  There are a number of other well-
known tax-free investments, which the New Zealand parent company could have 
invested the surplus funds in.  Redeemable preference shares issued by a loss 
company, which used the proceeds to invest in NZGS, would have achieved a similar 
tax outcome.   
 
7. Submissions : First Opportunity 
7.1 Overview of current CFC/FIF regimes 
Residents who invest in non-grey list countries are taxed on their income as it accrues. 
Under the CFC regime the income of the foreign entity is recalculated under New 
Zealand income tax principles and the relevant proportion of that income is attributed 
to the New Zealand shareholders.   
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When the BE income is repatriated to New Zealand as dividend, the previous tax can 
be offset against the FDWP payable in respect of that dividend.  Taxpayers with 
investments that are subject to the provisions of the FIF regime are generally speaking 
taxed on the income as it accrues rather than when it is distributed to the New Zealand 
investor.  The clearest example of this principle is the comparative value method. 
 
By way of contrast, a taxpayer who invests in a grey list country is not subject to the 
provisions of either regime and the income from their investment is only taxed when 
it is distributed.  The effective rate of tax is also affected by the provision of 
underlying foreign tax credits, and the ability to carry forward tax losses. 
 
Finally, in respect of investments in non-grey list countries, there is no distinction 
between active and passive income. 
 
7.2 Impact on non-resident investors 
The recognition of income on an accrual basis, and the absence of an active income 
exemption, has caused potential difficulties for non-resident shareholders who invest 
in New Zealand resident companies that are subject to either the CFC and/or FIF 
regimes.  The iniquitous results have caused successive governments to introduce 
regimes that are designed to alleviate some of the disadvantages caused to non-
resident shareholders.  For example, the conduit tax regime was introduced to 
alleviate the problems associated with companies that were owned by non-residents 
who invested off shore. One of the largest New Zealand companies adversely affected 
was Carter Holt Harvey’s investment in Chilean forestry companies.  That in turn 
created taxation difficulties for major foreign shareholders such as International 
Paper.  The conduit tax regime has created a clear inequity between non-resident and 
resident shareholders.   
 
7.3 The impact of subsequent changes to the international tax regime 
One of the original policy objectives reflected in both the CFC & FIF regimes was a 
clear desire to ensure that the New Zealand tax system did not distort investment 
patterns.  This would occur if a New Zealand resident faced the same rate of tax on all 
of their worldwide income regardless of its source.  In other words, that objective was 
designed to improve New Zealand’s welfare by reducing the extent to which New 
Zealand taxes distorted investment decisions.  The New Zealand approach was 
significantly different from other comparable jurisdictions where the primary 
objective was to reduce the scope for tax deferral and/or avoidance via the trapping of 
passive investment income tax haven entities.   
 
These objectives were to be achieved via the introduction of the CFC and FIF regimes 
along with an extension of the tax base to include a comprehensive capital gains tax.  
Placing a significant emphasis on the recognition of income on an accruals basis 
would ensure that New Zealand residents could not reduce or defer their New Zealand 
tax liability by diverting income into offshore companies or investment funds.  If 
foreign sourced income were only taxed on a realisation basis, this would have 
enabled New Zealand resident taxpayers to invest offshore and permanently defer 
New Zealand tax on that income.   
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However, there have been a number of significant changes to the tax system since the 
introduction of the CFC and FIF regimes.  They include the decision not to introduce 
a comprehensive capital gains tax, and grey list countries changing their domestic law 
to encourage non-resident passive investors to invest in tax preferred "conduct" 
structures.   
 
Secondly, the introduction of the Underlying Foreign Tax Credit (UFTC) regime 
caused a fundamental change in the policy objectives of the CFC regime.  Prior to the 
introduction of the UFTC regime, the primary objective was to ensure that foreign 
sourced income of New Zealand resident taxpayers was taxed at a similar rate to a 
domestic investment.  The UFTC regime was designed to reduce international double 
taxation by ensuring that resident investors were exposed to the same total amount of 
foreign and domestic tax on their foreign investments.  A third significant change is 
the recent increase in the top personal marginal rate of tax to 39%. 
 
The impact of these three events is that the effective rate of tax, which applies to 
investments in non-grey list countries, is much higher than was originally envisaged.  
Conversely, the effective rate of tax, which applies to investments in grey list 
countries and most comparable domestic investments, is much lower.  This occurs by 
virtue of the fact that New Zealand residents’ investment income from non-grey list 
countries is taxed on an accrual basis, whereas income from most domestic 
investments and grey list countries is taxed (if at all) on a realisation basis.  In 
addition, the FIF regime effectively imposes a capital gains tax on an unrealised basis.   
 
It was against this background that a number of submitters took the opportunity to 
present submissions prior to the McLeod Committee issuing its interim report.  The 
following recommendations were present in many of the leading submissions.  They 
reflect the underlying theme that the current CFC and FIF regimes had sacrificed 
international competitiveness in the blind pursuit of economic purity.88   
 
7.4 The CFC regime 
7.4.1 The active/passive distinction 
All of the major submitters89 noted that Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
the United States restricted the application of their comparable international tax 
regimes to “passive” or “tainted” investment income from property and rental income, 
interest, dividends, and intellectual property.  Active business income was generally 
exempt.  Submitters noted that passive income is more likely to involve deferral or tax 
avoidance via the trapping of this type of income in tax haven entities.  Given that 
New Zealand, Hungary, and Sweden are the only countries that tax active business 
income of their resident multinational corporations (MNC) the question arises as to 
the international competitiveness of New Zealand entities, which derive active (i.e. 
business income).   
                                            
88
 See Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand, “Submission to the Tax Review 2001”, 15 
March 2001 p13, paragraph 5.0 (ICANZ). 
89
 See for example, “Buddle Findlay Submission to the Tax Review 2001”, p6 submission 1 (BF), 
ICANZ p13, KPMG “McLeod Committee Submission” March 2001 (KPMG) p23, New Zealand 
Business Round Table “Submission on the Tax Review 2001” March 2001, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
“Tax Review 2001: Submission to the Chair of the Tax Review 19 March 2001” (PWC). 
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One submitter went so far as to suggest that to the extent the comparable Australian 
regime contains an active exemption then all other things equal, New Zealand MNCs 
are likely to relocate to Australia.90   
 
Another submitter91 noted that the New Zealand Treasury had expressed the view that 
the active/passive distinction had been extensively examined and had been rejected 
for theoretical and practical reasons.  That position is untenable in view of the 
summary noted above.  Briefly, the 18 June 1987 Budget specifically referred to the 
distinction between active and passive income. Secondly the possibility of introducing 
an active/passive distinction was noted in submissions to the original Consultative 
Committee on full imputation and international tax reform.  The March 1988 Report 
of that Committee recommended an exclusion from the proposal for non controlling 
interests in “active” tax haven entities.  The government expressed a reservation and 
reinforced its concern in the Report on International Tax Reform, Part Two.  The 
proposed active/passive distinction was omitted from the draft legislation and to the 
best of the author’s knowledge this distinction has never been raised in any official 
documents issued by the Treasury, Inland Revenue or successive governments since 
that date.  It is difficult to accept the Treasury assertion that there has been previous 
consultation on the merits of an active/passive distinction.   
 
7.4.2 Ring fencing of losses 
The same group of submitters were equally forceful in their submissions on the 
current penal treatment of CFC losses.  A CFC can only carry a loss forward and that 
loss is ring fenced in the jurisdiction in which the loss arose.  Submitters noted that 
there is a degree of similarity with other countries’ rules on consolidation, but that in 
many cases loss quarantining only occurs in the context of a separate capital gains tax 
regime.   
 
A common concern was that a regime which taxed successful investments but failed 
to give adequate relief for poor investments would invariably lead to under investment 
due to the arbitrary impact of the current ring fencing regime.   
 
7.4.3 Reform of the grey list 
Most submitters92 recommended an extension of the current grey list to include 
countries with which New Zealand has a double tax agreement, that have a proven 
record of protecting their tax base, and have comparable rates of tax.  The 
international tax regime was introduced in 1988.  Since then New Zealand’s capital 
and trade flows have changed significantly.  Many of New Zealand’ major trading 
partners are located in South East Asia yet there is a disincentive to invest capital into 
those markets.  A second significant change has been the enlargement of the European 
Union.  However, only three EU countries are included on the grey list.   
                                            
90
 Note 89, KPMG p23. 
91
 Note 89, PWC p14. 
92
 All submitters referred to a note 89 except KPMG. 
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7.5 The FIF regime 
7.5.1 Threshold 
Most of the submissions were extremely brief and to the point.  A number of 
submitters recommended that the current threshold should be increased from $50,000 
to $1 million.  There was very little analysis (if any) to support their upper limits.   
 
7.5.2 Public company exemption 
One submitter93 recommended a general exemption for all listed public companies.  
This would overcome the compliance issues created by the complicated nature of the 
calculations required under the FIF alternatives.  Secondly, it would recognise the fact 
that portfolio investors are generally speaking not in a position to influence the 
distribution policy of a foreign company, which is listed on a recognised exchange.   
 
7.5.3 Realisation basis 
Most submitters noted that the emphasis under the current regime on the taxation of 
unrealised capital gains and unrealised foreign currency gains is inconsistent with the 
taxation of a comparable New Zealand sourced investment.  Those two features 
created a strong disincentive for people considering migrating to New Zealand.  
Submitters acknowledged the important role a FIF regime could play in the protection 
of the New Zealand tax base but emphasised that these two features were not 
necessary and were likely to discourage migrants and New Zealand residents 
diversifying their portfolio investments.   
 
8. Tax Review 2001: The June Issues Paper 
8.1 Tentative conclusions 
The McLeod Committee clearly understood the investment distortions caused by the 
current regimes.  Under the heading “Business Interests and International 
Competitiveness” the McLeod Committee noted that94 
 
At this stage the Review has the preliminary view that the current 
compromise in the taxation of offshore income of New Zealanders is 
not sound and that change is necessary. … 
 
At this stage we would recommend repeal of the grey list.  This 
recommendation would be made on the proviso that the repeal can be 
fitted within a revised and satisfactory regime for offshore investment.  
                                            
93
 PriceWaterhouseCoopers “Tax Review 2001: Submission to the Chair of the Tax Review 19 March 
2001” (PWC) at p18-19. 
94
 Tax Review 2001: Issues Paper June 2001 at pp147-152, paragraphs 99-125. 
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We would not recommend this change if the effect was to bring all 
investment within the scope of the current CFC and FIF regimes.  We 
contemplate recommending a repeal of the narrow seven country grey 
list in the context of a shift to an international tax regime for outbound 
investment along the lines of one of the options raised below.95 
 
8.2 The business communities ‘wish list’ 
A number of submitters had a clear view on a more appropriate framework for taxing 
New Zealand residents on their foreign sourced income.  The McLeod Committee 
noted that New Zealand’s CFC and FIF regimes were the most far reaching in the 
world.  The McLeod Committee acknowledged that96 most of New Zealand’s major 
trading partners who had enacted comparable regimes, were primarily targeted at tax 
avoidance and that they inevitably contained measures which narrowed their scope, 
such as an active/passive distinction.  Accordingly, the McLeod Committee noted that 
a number of submitters were strongly of the view that the current CFC and FIF 
regimes placed New Zealand foreign business operations at a comparative 
disadvantage.  If the current CFC and FIF regimes were to be amended to better 
reflect the business community’s interpretation of “international tax norms”, then the 
following changes would be required. 
- Repeal all provisions, which effectively tax New Zealand residents on their 
unrealised capital gains. 
- Confine the ambit of both regimes to tax avoidance and tax deferral opportunities. 
- The enactment of an active/passive distinction.  CFC income would only be 
attributed to a New Zealand taxpayer if the CFC income fell into the “passive” 
category.  Active income would only be taxed when repatriated to New Zealand.   
- The primary emphasis under the FIF regime would be to prevent the deferral of 
New Zealand tax on offshore passive income.   
- Foreign tax credits would continue to be permitted in accordance with New 
Zealand’s DTA obligations. 
The McLeod Committee acknowledged that its recommendations involved a trade off 
between economic theory, real world considerations, and the three competing 
objectives of taxpayer compliance, dead weight costs, and New Zealand’s DTA 
obligations. There were two primary issues,( being foreign tax credits and the timing 
of the derivation of offshore income), which  shaped their recommendations.   
 
8.3 Treatment of foreign tax credits 
In relation to foreign tax credits the McLeod Committee recognised there were two 
broad approaches.  The first was to continue with the status quo.  This would require 
New Zealand to recognise foreign tax credits in respect of income sourced from treaty 
countries.  Furthermore, the McLeod Committee recognised a similar treatment for 
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 Paragraphs 117-120.  The two options are summarised in paragraph 8.6. 
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 Note 94 at p147 paragraph 100. 
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non-treaty countries, because of the risk of introducing a significant distortion in 
favour of treaty countries.  The second approach was the risk-free return method 
(RFRM).  Under this approach, the actual income earned from the offshore 
investment is ignored.  A taxpayer’s gross income is the notional income earned from 
the investment on the assumption that the taxpayer had invested in a risk-free asset 
such as NZGS.  The RFRM method taxes a presumptive return, which is adjusted for 
inflation, and no actual deductions such as interest would be permitted.  It is the 
presumptive return as opposed to the actual return, which is taxed.  Secondly, the 
RFRM method would not allow any deduction for foreign tax credits.  However, in 
cases where the risk-free-return rate is below the actual return earned from the foreign 
investment, it will result in a lower level of taxation.   
 
The primary advantages identified by the McLeod Committee from implementing the 
RFRM method would be the elimination of current distortions, which influence 
taxpayer’s decisions about whether to invest in “income generating” or “capital 
growth” equities.  The RFRM method is not without controversy.  Any foreign asset, 
which experienced a sharp drop in value during a particular income year, would not 
receive a compensating reduction in the RFRM rate until the following year’s 
valuation was undertaken.  Secondly, the RFRM method would be calculated 
independently of the taxpayer’s actual cash flows, which could cause taxpayers to 
realise liquid assets to pay the tax arising from the presumptive income.  Finally, any 
alteration to a portfolio arising from the acquisition and disposal of equities could 
create difficulties for calculating the value of net assets at the start of the year.  This 
difficulty could presumably be overcome by basing the value of net assets at the 
commencement of the year on the basis of the average of opening and closing values.   
 
8.4 Recognition of income 
In relation to the timing of the derivation of offshore income, the McLeod Committee 
were highly critical of the current CFC and FIF regimes, and appear to have endorsed 
most of the submissions summarised above.  However, they went further than the 
submitters and specifically noted the distortionary effect created by certain unit trust 
structures.   
 
“[W]e are also concerned that vehicles such as low tax United 
Kingdom unit trusts are being used for investment into non-grey list 
countries, thereby undermining the rationale for the grey list. … At this 
stage we would recommend repeal of the grey list.  This 
recommendation would be made on the proviso that the repeal can be 
fitted with a revised and satisfactory regime for offshore investment.”97 
 
However, their recommendation was subject to the important qualification that the 
repeal of the grey list was not designed to bring all offshore investment within the 
scope of either the CFC or FIF regimes.  Their recommendation was linked to one of 
the following options.   
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 Note 94 at p151, paragraphs 119-120. 
CFC/FIF ARTICLE 
   68 
8.5 Future reform options 
The two policy options, which McLeod Committee evaluated in the context of the 
repeal of the grey list, were: 
 
- A modified CFC regime, which would involve the introduction of an 
active/passive distinction for direct foreign investment outside of a designated list 
of low tax/tax haven countries.  In the case of portfolio investments (i.e. holdings 
of less than 10%) and widely held unit trusts, the RFRM method would apply.   
- The second option involved the application of the RFRM method to all offshore 
and domestic investments, or alternatively to offshore investments.  The impact of 
this option would affect taxpayers as follows.  Portfolio investors in grey list 
countries would experience an increase in the level of taxation under the RFRM 
method, whereas investors in non-grey list FIFs would expect a reduction in the 
current level of income tax.   
9. The Submitters Response 
9.1 Economic theory and active/passive income 
The Corporate Taxpayers Group (CTG) joined the major March 2001 submitters.98  In 
relation to the foreign tax credit and derivation of offshore income, the Issues Paper 
provoked a wide range of responses.   
 
The CTG strongly attacked the formulation of tax policy based on economic theory, 
which reflects dubious assumptions.  Some of their concerns were reflected in the 
Issues Paper.99  For example:100  
 
“In a world where individuals and entities do not change residence 
and other countries apply similar principles, we accept the logic of the 
[see-saw] models implication that, if New Zealand does not levy any 
“net” tax on non residents investment into New Zealand it should 
allow only a deduction for foreign taxes.” 
 
The CTG noted that New Zealand residents will and have changed their tax residence 
in response to the current international regime.  The most recent summary of wealthy 
individuals who have migrated from New Zealand was provided by Deborah Hill 
Cone in a recent article in the National Business Review [9 May 2003] "The Tax 
Gypsies".  The individuals include inter alia Sir Michael Fay, David Richwhite, Eric 
Watson and Alan Gibbs (who is the inventor of an amphibious motor car). Secondly, 
the CTG noted that:  
 
“No country in the world has adopted our international regime.  Quite 
the contrary, many of our trading partners adopt an avoidance 
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 Corporate Taxpayers Group Submission 31 August 2001.  The reference to this submission is B236. 
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 Note 94 at p3-5 Annex I. 
100
 Note 94 p149, paragraph 104. 
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perspective in designing their international tax regimes and therefore 
have regimes based on active/passive exemptions.” 
 
Given that the economic theory noted by the McLeod Committee depends on other 
countries adopting a similar approach, and given that this has not occurred, the CTG 
and the McLeod Committee saw little benefit in New Zealand continuing to ignore the 
fact that the rest of the world has coped with the active/passive distinction.   
 
9.3 Foreign tax credits 
None of the submitters supported the recommendation that New Zealand should adopt 
the seesaw principle, which in its pure form would replace the current foreign tax 
credit regime with a deduction.  The strongest criticism was made by the CTG:101   
 
“The fundamental issue is whether New Zealand corporates are to be 
allowed to operate internationally.  Currently they are already generally 
at a competitive disadvantage.  Disallowing all foreign tax credits, even 
if possible given existing treaties, would be tantamount to imposing a toll 
on domestic corporates international activities, the penal nature of which 
would be fundamental.” 
 
9.4 The risk free return method 
The submitters did not adopt a uniform approach in their response to the RFRM 
proposal.102   
 
For example, PWC supported the application of the RFRM method to outbound 
investments.  KPMG also supported the RFRM method but were concerned about the 
increased tax burden and cash flow difficulties imposed on taxpayers whose actual 
rate of return was less than the presumptive return.  The ICANZ believed that the 
RFRM method should be confined to the FIF regime and in particular it would be a 
suitable replacement for the current deemed rate of return method.   
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the CTG outlined a number of significant criticisms, 
which were not considered by the other submitters.  They took issue with the 
Committee’s observation that the potential reaction of treaty partners to the 
disallowance of tax credits under the RFRM method would require further 
consideration.  The members of that group strongly submitted that New Zealand’s 
treaty partners would not accept the denial of foreign tax credits and therefore the 
potential application of the RFRM method to treaty country investments was highly 
suspect.  If their observation was correct, then it would follow that the adoption of the 
RFRM method would create a tax preference in favour of treaty countries.   
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 Note 98 at p30.      
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9.5 The active/passive distinction 
All of the submissions spoke with a single united voice on the matter.  If New Zealand 
hopes to achieve an internationally comparable regime, which permits New Zealand 
resident companies to successfully compete in international markets, then an active 
income exemption is imperative.   
 
9.6 Repeal of the grey list and replacement with what? 
Most submitters supported the McLeod Committee’s recommendation to repeal the 
grey list and replace it with a satisfactory alternative.  A number of submitters 
believed that the RFRM method was not a suitable or feasible replacement.  
Accordingly, they raised a number of additional possibilities.  For example the CTG 
suggested that the grey list could be expanded to include all countries with a corporate 
tax rate of at least 20%.  In relation to portfolio investments, they also supported an 
exemption for publicly listed companies that are actively traded on any recognised 
stock exchange.103  Finally, they recommended an increase in the de minimis 
exemption from $50,000 to $100,000.  The ICANZ supported each of these three 
recommendations.104 
 
One of the main concerns of all submitters was the underlying philosophy of the CFC 
and FIF regimes.  Are they primarily designed to protect the New Zealand tax base 
from the type of avoidance/referral strategies discussed above, or is their role 
primarily to achieve tax neutrality?   
 
10. The McLeod Committee’s Final Report 
10.1 A difficult balancing act 
The McLeod Committee’s final paper acknowledged the impact of the concerns raised 
by corporate taxpayers summarised above.105  For example, the McLeod Committee 
was unable to recommend the application of the RFRM method to all offshore 
investments.  However, the McLeod Committee was unable to accept a number of the 
crucial recommendations such as the adoption of the active/passive distinction.  The 
McLeod Committee candidly acknowledged that they were unable to resolve some of 
the underlying tensions between economic theory and international practice identified 
in the Issues Paper.   
 
The key issue we have been unable to resolve is whether New Zealand 
should seek to tax offshore income as earned or more generally defer 
tax until repatriation.  The current rules are an unhappy compromise 
and there remains considerable dissatisfaction with the present 
position.  The tension is between the desires for the tax system not to 
produce tax incentives for residents to invest offshore. And the fact that 
the international standard adopted by other countries (an 
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active/passive) regime is founded on such an incentive.  The concern 
is that New Zealand’s failure to follow the international standard 
produces significant losses for the country because it contributes 
significantly to the decisions by non-residents not to migrate to New 
Zealand and by residents to leave New Zealand. (Emphasis added)106 
 
10.2 The current CFC regime 
The McLeod Committee acknowledged that the current regime has been observed to 
contribute to decisions by New Zealand residents to leave New Zealand and by non- 
residents not to migrate to New Zealand.  The Committee acknowledged that overseas 
jurisdictions generally adopted the active/passive distinction, which was supported by 
all of the primary submissions.  The review Committee expressed concerns about the 
definition issues surrounding the distinction and the risk and that its adoption would 
create a distortion in favour of offshore investment.  Accordingly, no firm 
recommendation was made.  Their solution was for interested parties to discuss 
whether it was possible to reach an agreement on the active/passive approach.   
 
We have considered the active/passive approach, which would defer 
New Zealand tax on active offshore earnings until repatriation, and for 
which business interests advocate.  We do not embrace it with 
enthusiasm because of its distortionary effect towards offshore 
investment and the definitional issues it poses.  But there are real 
issues of cost to New Zealand of not following this international 
standard.  Our suggestion is that the government engage in further 
dialogue with interested parties to determine whether an agreement 
can be reached on the broad outline of an active/passive approach.   
 
If the interested parties could not reach an agreement, then the Committee suggested 
that:  
- the problem would be reduced by cutting the corporate rate of tax, and 
- considering if the RFRM could be introduced as an alternative method, which 
taxpayers could elect instead of the current CFC/FIF regimes.   
 
10.3 The current FIF regime 
The McLeod Committee noted that the current taxation of domestic and offshore-
managed funds is inconsistent and requires consistency of treatment.  New Zealand 
managed funds are generally taxed on all investments whether in a grey list or non-
grey list countries.  However, a New Zealand based passive fund, which has obtained 
the appropriate IRD ruling is not subject to tax on its investment gains.  Portfolio 
investors in grey list managed funds are not taxed on any realised capital gains even if 
there is little tax payable in the grey list country.  The final report specifically referred 
to certain Australian and United Kingdom unit trusts.107  For these reasons, the 
McLeod Committee had little hesitation in recommending the: 
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application of the RFRM method for all portfolio investments in 
offshore listed entities and offshore retail unit trusts.  The RFRM 
method would apply whether such investments were in grey list or non-
grey list organisations. 
 
To this extent, the current FIF regime and its emphasis on grey list countries would 
become irrelevant.   
 
11. Conclusion 
11.1 What are the objectives of the CFC/FIF regime 
Both regimes were designed to reduce the tax avoidance and tax deferral 
opportunities, which were associated with pre CFC/FIF offshore investments.  To this 
extent the original proposals were consistent with the six other jurisdictions that had 
created similar regimes.   
 
An equally important objective was to reduce the extent to which New Zealand tax 
distorted the onshore-offshore investment decisions of New Zealand residents.  This 
would be achieved if the CFC/FIF regimes would ensure that foreign sourced income 
derived by New Zealand residents was taxed at the same time and at the same rate that 
would have been applicable to a domestic investment.   
 
Whereas the comparable legislative regimes were aimed at passive investments 
located in tax havens this was not the sole emphasis of the December 1987 
announcements.  Comparable tax treatment could only be achieved with the 
introduction of the comprehensive tax CGT.  If that had occurred then the emphasis 
under the CFC/FIF regimes on taxing income as it accrues rather than when it is 
distributed would have ensured a greater degree of consistency between onshore and 
offshore passive investments.   
 
The international tax environment has changed dramatically since the December 1987 
discussion document.  New Zealand has not introduced a comprehensive CGT.  In the 
case of domestic portfolio investments held by an individual New Zealand resident 
who is not a dealer or trader, only the dividend flows are subject to tax.  A comparable 
grey list portfolio investment is taxed in a similar manner but a non-grey list 
investment is significantly over taxed.   
 
The sensitivity of non-resident portfolio investment decisions to source country 
taxation was the rationale for the introduction of both FITC and AIL regimes.  It 
would seem to follow that any disparity in effective tax rates distorts the domestic and 
foreign portfolio investment decisions of New Zealand residents.  Tax considerations 
are a major factor and the clearest evidence of this is the Minister's concern in August 
2003 over Australian unit trusts, which can be used as a conduit for investing in 
NZGS.  Similar issues surround OEICs and grey list unit trusts such as Foreign & 
Colonial.  But this seems to have escaped the Minister's attention.  Portfolio 
investment decisions of New Zealand residents are no longer determined by the merits 
of the alternative investment but vagaries of the New Zealand international tax 
regime, which is a significant detriment, faced by investors.  Furthermore this issue is 
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not confined to the FIF regime.  Careful tax planning can also defeat the current CFC 
regime, which can be used to avoid New Zealand tax on New Zealand, sourced 
passive income.   
 
The McLeod Committee identified a number of unresolved fundamental tensions, 
which are reflected in the current CFC/FIF regimes.  Their analysis suggests that the 
time has come for a comprehensive solution, which starts, from a review of the 
original December 1987 policy objectives.  A piecemeal ‘band aid’ approach will not 
resolve the tensions identified in paragraph 10.1.   
 
The December 2003 Discussion Document may provide an opportunity for a 
reconsideration of how New Zealand currently taxes offshore income, and the 
alternative taxation models adopted by interalia New Zealand’s major trading 
partners. 
 
11.2  An active income exemption 
The comparative study undertaken by Arnold and Dibout in 2001 indicated that New 
Zealand, Hungary, and Sweden were the only countries that had NOT adopted an 
active income exemption. This suggests that a priority of any reform would be to 
introduce an active income exemption into the current CFC regime.  This would bring 
New Zealand into line with a fundamental international norm.  As at 1 January 2001 
20 of the 23 countries that had adopted a CFC regime have included this exemption.  
The primary explanation for this phenomenon is to preserve international 
competitiveness.  For example if Air New Zealand were to own a tourist hotel in inter 
alia Hong Kong, the Cook Islands, or Tonga, could it be seriously argued that the 
investment should ipso facto become subject to the CFC regime simply because those 
three tourist destinations are also tax havens? The IRD and Treasury have had a 
longstanding concern about the difficulty of policing an active/passive boundary and 
whether it would produce any bias in favour of certain types of investment.  However, 
the work undertaken by Sandler and Arnold in their country surveys strongly suggests 
that the collective experience of the 20 countries that have introduced this distinction 
does not create any significant difficulties in practice.108   
 
11.3 Reform of the Grey List 
It would appear that there has been a significant conceptual shift in the rationale for 
the grey list.  There were originally 61 countries, which formed the “black list”, and 
they included most of the well-known international tax havens.  That suggested the 
role of the grey list was to prevent deferral and tax avoidance strategies, which was 
consistent with the approach of comparable regimes.   
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 The author has not undertaken a comprehensive review of the experience of NZ major trading 
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However, the current grey list consists of seven countries which suggest that there has 
been a shift away from an anti avoidance focus to notions of capital export neutrality.  
This principle reflects the assumption that there should be no tax preference for any 
type of foreign investment.  The McLeod Committee correctly noted that the present 
grey list is inconsistent with this principle because it creates an inbuilt bias or 
incentive to invest into those seven countries because they are exempt from the CFC 
and FIF regimes.   
 
11.4 The RFRM method 
No other country has used this method to tax offshore direct investment and offshore 
portfolio investments.  It would represent a significant variation from the international 
norms discussed by authors such as Arnold and Sandler. 
 
In the case of an individual New Zealand resident investor who was faced with two 
identical investments, one onshore and offshore, the introduction of the RFRM 
method would create a bias in favour of the domestic investment because the latter 
would not be subject to the RFRM.  It the case of the offshore investment the RFRM 
would however represent an improvement over the deemed rate of return method, 
which is, based on the average five-year nominal government stock rate plus a margin 
of 4%.  The RFRM method has a lower presumptive rate of return and therefore 
would result in a lower effective tax rate than an identical investment that is subject to 
the deemed rate of return method. This conclusion is subject to the proviso that 
borrowing was not used to fund the comparable investment which is subject to the 
deemed rate of return method because the RFRM method ignores all interest costs.  
 
11.5 Future reform 
  
Part B of this article will consider these issues taking into account the proposals 
contained in the December 2003 Issues Paper on the “Taxation of non-controlled 
offshore investment in equity”. That document outlines two options for changing the 
way that equity investments that are currently subject to the FIF regime are taxed. The 
first option is a variation on the risk- free rate of return method recommended by the 
McLeod Committee. The second option is a more radical proposal, which that would 
apply to all offshore portfolio investments irrespective of the country of investment or 
the type of investor. In practice this option would effectively tax all investors on 70% 
of realised capital gains irrespective of the location of the investment or whether it 
was held on capital or revenue account. 
 
In relation to the CFC regime part B will examine the recent Australian proposals and 
consider their appropriateness in light of the McLeod Committee recommendations.  
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